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Abstract
This thesis begins with a critique of Quentin Meillassoux’s Après la finitude. Chapter One
argues against Meillassoux’s injunction to abandon the “transcendental,” while putting forth
a Lacanian solution to the “correlationist” problem. Chapter Two expounds the meaning of
the Cartesian subject, with a Lacanian twist. Under this view, the subject is split, and this
split carries the name “sexual difference.” The cogito is “split” qua sexual difference,
whereby sexual difference names the structural antagonism/impossibility that exists in
language and bears on all speaking subjects. The second chapter focuses primarily on
explaining how sexual difference marks the cogito, by expanding on Alenka Zupančič’s
“What is Sex,” and Lacan’s Seminar XX. Finally, Chapter Three discusses the Cartesian
phenomenon of love, in looking at Descartes’ most obscure text, The Passions of the Soul.
The third chapter serves as a “testing site” for the theses of the first two chapters, such that
the experience of love makes explicit the argument that the cogito is split.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This thesis investigates the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s reading of René Descartes’ cogito
(the argument that my thought necessarily implies my being) against the backdrop of
contemporary French philosophy. Why is this important, you might ask? What is striking
about psychoanalytic theory is how it comes to bear on how we conceive of identity and our
relation to others. For the purpose of this thesis, we will venture to understand what
psychoanalysis, early modern philosophy, and “sexual difference,” share in common. The
wager of this thesis is that the cogito, the figure that issues from the supposed dualism (the
assertion that one’s mind and body are separate), provides insight into the contemporary
cultural situation, specifically pertaining to questions of “sex” and “love.” While the cogito
has been presumed responsible for a myriad of harms, from male domination to
environmental catastrophe, this thesis argues that what we claim to know about the cogito is
misleading. In contrast to this assumption, this will argue that there is a subversive kernel
within the philosophy of Descartes.
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Chapter 1

1

Prolegomena to Any Future (Continental) Philosophy

The perdurance of philosophy and the question of (Continental) philosophy’s relation to
futurity is a concern that subtends and organizes the research of this thesis. This question
determines the partnerships that are forged, or forced, in herein. That is to say, the
speculative partnership between René Descartes and Jacques Lacan bears on the debate
that surrounds the philosophy, or theory, of the subject. To this end, this thesis draws
attention to the arguments and consequences of formulating a philosophy of the Cartesian
subject, with a Lacanian twist. Thus, we will venture to re-visit the Cartesian “wound,”
the unyielding site of modern philosophy’s beginning, which has produced what a certain
philosopher has termed the “specter” of the Cartesian cogito: a haunting, ubiquitous hum
that plagues Western philosophy and academia more broadly.1 Not only does this thesis
intend to revisit the site of the cogito’s emergence, it also puts forth a reading of the
cogito that challenges the aegis of the philosophical enterprise “at both ends” of the
academic tradition.
“Sexual difference” is not what comes to mind when most of us think of the cogito.
Rather, the cogito solicits the figure of a self-transparent thinking substance, an epistemic
subject who relies on the guarantee of a non-deceiving Other. It is the intention of this
thesis to “desynonymize” the cogito from its proverbial cage, and to clear a way for a
discursive opening whereby it can be thought with psychoanalysis.2 Accordingly, this
thesis strings together Lacan’s most explicit readings of Descartes in the Seminar XI: The
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Seminar XX: Encore, and Seminar XIV:
The Logic of Phantasy.

The “specter” of the Cartesian cogito which haunts ‘Western Academia” is Žižek’s formulation in The Ticklish
Subject.
1

I have borrowed the term “Desynonymize” from Tilottama Ragan’s Deconstruction and the Remainder of
Phenomenology.
2

2

Chapter One (“The World Descartes Left Us”) begins with a challenge to Quentin
Meillassoux’s indictment of Kant in Après la finitude, in order to demonstrate how the
more radical critique of “correlationism,” already exists in Lacan. In this chapter,
Meillassoux is considered at his most speculative, while attention is drawn to his
presuppositions, namely the presumed homogeneity between “subject” and “reality.”
Through Lacan, the formulation of the “correlation” is inverted, and a “negative
correlation,” is postulated: the correlation of the split subject who straddles the
Impossible/Real, thus boring a hole in the concept of reality. This (re)formulation poses a
fundamental challenge to Meillassoux’s argument, thus introducing a new task: to relate
the inaccessible In-itself to the split in the subject herself. What will break the solipsistic
circle of correlationism is the hole that bores from within the subject, which marks the
very presence of the Thing. Otherwise put, this chapter focuses on highlighting the
meaning of the subject qua object, and how this formulation links Descartes to Lacan.
Chapter Two, the eponymous chapter of this thesis, seeks to bore a deeper hole in
thinking through the structural problem of sexual difference. Here, Descartes is put into
dialogue with Freud and Lacan, in order to respond to the question that organizes the
inquiry of this thesis. Thus, this chapter argues that it is possible to postulate a
“masculine” and “feminine” cogito, and the effort of the second chapter is to defend this
claim. Finally, Chapter Three (“Cogito in Love”) functions as testing site, whereby the
previous theses can be “tested” in parallel with the Cartesian concept of love. This
chapter argues that the experience of love makes explicit the claim that the cogito is split,
a split that is supported by the logic of sexuation.
What is sui generis about this thesis is that it takes up previous arguments and
conjectures, while engaging with contemporary philosophy, in order to further these
theses/hypotheses; namely, that the cogito can be conceived of as “split,” thus, it bears
the mark of a schism that is structured by sexual division. This claim was put forth by
Slavoj Žižek in the late nineties (and it somewhat elaborated on in Less Than Nothing),
and is supported by the incursion of Alenka Zupančič What is Sex? (2017), a text which
forces us to rethink sex as an ontological question. While Zupančič does not engage
Descartes explicitly, this thesis will demonstrate how the developments put forth in What
is Sex? enable us to read Descartes in relation to the formulas of sexuation, which affords
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us the possibility to postulate that the Cartesian subject is the subject of the
unconscious. Furthermore, apropos the challenge posed by Meillassoux’s Après, rather
than softening the Kantian blow, it enables us to respond to Meillassoux’s critique of
correlationism, venturing further than he aimed. Thus, the double incursion of What is
Sex? and Après la finitude serve to present (despite the latter’s intention) a novel defense
of the subject of philosophy, conceived along Lacanian lines.

4

The World Descartes Left Us
“I don't much like hearing that we have gone beyond Hegel, the way one hears we have
gone beyond Descartes. We go beyond everything and always end up in the same place/
Hence, an ever more elaborate mastery.”
Lacan, Séminaire II, 71
The incursion of Quentin Meillassoux’s Après la finitude has forced us to rethink
philosophy’s relationship to Kant. Those whose work is firmly grounded in German
Idealism are less enthusiastic about this emphatic leap into realist terrain. Apropos of the
key argument in Après, Meillassoux contends that, since Kant, philosophy cannot
overcome the “correlation” of subject and world. His polemical bon mot,
“correlationism,” claims that thinking the world can only take place subjectively.
Otherwise put, there is a philosophical straitjacket between thought and being.
Meillassoux sets out a philosophical task for himself that is characteristic of all
courageous thinking: utterly lacking in humility and seeking a violent breach with
previous thought “is the relinquishing of transcendentalism” (Meillassoux, 27).
Among Meillassoux’s critics is Catherine Malabou, who, in her provocative essay, “Can
We Relinquish the Transcendental?” responds to Meillassoux’s call to abandon the
transcendental and the (finite) subject of philosophy. As Malabou notes, in the French,
the actual word used by Meillassoux is not “relinquish,” as it appears in the translated
text, but abandonment: “l’abandon du transcendental” (Malabou, 243). She notes that
Meillassoux, and others who follow his theoretical steps, are not seeking a “negotiated
rupture,” as previous philosophers have, but rather, a total abandonment of the
transcendental. To this end, Malabou raises a question that pertains to the future of
Continental philosophy: can we relinquish the transcendental (Kantian philosophy) and
still call ourselves (Continental) philosophers?

5

At this juncture, it seems important to gloss what is meant by “the transcendental.” The
transcendental is a philosophical concept that issues directly from Kant’s critical
philosophy. In attempt to overcome the Humean problematic of an irreducible
contingency and the dogmatic metaphysics of Christian Wolff (and Leibniz), Kant’s
critical project transformed philosophy, launching what we now call “Continental”
philosophy. Kant’s philosophy was assumed to be a fortified knowledge—in the sense of
“indestructible” knowledge—as Lacan qualifies the indestructibility of Freud’s
discovery. By this, I allege, following Malabou, that Kant’s critical philosophy has
stained all of philosophy which has followed in its wake. In his Critique of Pure Reason,
the transcendental is coextensive with the a priori (independent of all experience), and it
is synonymous with questions that concern the condition of possibility of knowledge.
Meillassoux’s argument focuses on deduction in the Kantian armature, arguing that the
structure of the a priori and condition of possibility is circular. Thus, there can be no
transcendental deduction of the transcendental. It remains a “presupposition” without
demonstration. Deduction, as a formal operation, is supposed to be leached of
uncertainty, and without presupposition. Meillassoux puts Kant on the rack for failing to
deduce, and demonstrate absolutely, the categories, ideas, and principles that ground the
transcendental deduction. He argues that there is no deduction of the transcendental
deduction in Kant. Meillassoux’s horror issues from the fact than Kant posits, rather than
demonstrates, these facticities. Indeed, from Descartes to Kant, these “presuppositions”
protrude and, in doing so, reveal gaps—but are they, the presuppositions, not the very
seduction of deduction? Descartes’ recourse to the Big Other (God) and Kant’s positing
of categories, principles, and ideas without absolutely demonstrating them is suggestive
of a certain gap or hole that organizes philosophy as such.3 The horror of what is
philosophically unaccounted for; the “presuppositions” that haunt philosophy are
certainly not of novel concern. Malabou reminds us of Hegel’s critique of Kant, and the

In the Écrits, Lacan writes: “In the ego Descartes accentuates through the superfluousness of its function in certain of
his Latin texts (a subject of exegesis I leave here to the specialists), one must grasp the point at which it continues to be
what it presents itself as: dependent on the God of religion. A curious scrap [chute] of ergo, the ego is bound up with
this God. Descartes’ approach is, singularly, one of safeguarding the ego from the deceitful God, and thereby
safeguarding the ego’s partner, going so far as to endow the latter with the exorbitant privilege of guaranteeing the
eternal truths only insofar as he is their creator,” 865.
3
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contemporary reverberations that can be found in Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida
(Malabou, 244). In Glas, Derrida describes the transcendental viscerally, as the “vomit of
the system,” as that which imposes itself somewhat arbitrarily, while remaining
“outside.” For her part, Malabou focuses on Foucault’s engagement with the
transcendental in Archeology of Knowledge, as well as in What is Enlightenment?
Malabou argues that we must distinguish between the operative gestures of relinquishing
and abandoning. She argues that Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida (the “previous
philosophers”) relinquished the transcendental (a negotiated rupture). What remains in
their system is a Kantian residuum, a “quasi” transcendental remainder, which, according
to Malabou, is the trace of the “transcendental,” and whether this term exudes
metaphysical orthodoxy or not, “[it] circumscribes what may be seen as the minimal
creed of continental philosophy” (Malabou, 245). She finds refuge in Foucault’s
definition of the transcendental in The Archaeology of Knowledge, which, she argues, is
emblematic of the posture associated with a negotiated rupture (relinquishment), rather
than abandonment. As a “play of forms,” the transcendental “anticipates all contents,” as
they have “already rendered them possible” (Foucault, 421). Foucault’s description is not
an attempt to abandon the transcendental tout court but should be conceived as a critical
(re)elaboration.4 Conversely, Meillassoux and others like him, seek to abandon tout court
the transcendental and its consequences, which includes its “minimal creed,” and any
residuum. Specifically, Malabou argues that Meillassoux seeks to abolish irreducibility as
such (Malabou, 246). The philosophical master concept of irreducibility, Meillassoux
argues, is not borne of what could be deduced, but rather it remains purely factual: it is
decisionary. As Meillassoux writes in the opening pages: “Correlation is of course
another name for synthesis,” by this, he argues that the synthesis of correlation is the
inextricable bond between subject and object, such that each becomes unthinkable

Foucault’s discussion of the “play of forms” can be found in his responses to the questions from the Cercle
d’Épistémologie. Details of this discussion and its context can be found here:
http://cahiers.kingston.ac.uk/synopses/syn9.2.html.
4
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without the other, and is thus “irreducible” (Meillassoux, 5). Irreducibility is thus
coextensive with the transcendental.5
As a possible “way out” of the inherent contradiction of the Kantian system, Meillassoux
posits the concept of “ancestrality,” which attempts to think the world’s anteriority, its
existence prior to synthesis, which necessarily confers a propertarian relation over the
world. The notion of ancestrality invites us to think a world where the subject is
necessarily absent, and to explore a crevice of speculation that is prior to experience or
judgment. Meillassoux suggests that this concept affords attempts to unlike the subject
from the “world,” to de-substantialize subjectivity. Malabou describes this concept as
dependent on a desert world, which is “deserted, neutral, dispossessed,” a world that is
“indifferent to the fact of being thought” (Malabou, 248). Malabou argues that the
concept of the absolute put forth by Meillassoux—a world absolutely bereft of the
subject—becomes another word for indifference. In seeking to link this modality of
indifference to Meillassoux’s concept of alterity, it seems necessary to understand why
Meillassoux rejects the supposed necessity of the world. It follows that Meillassoux must
reject the modality of necessity as the a priori synthesis in Kant is essentially a
transcendental guarantee of the universality of the “order of things.” By contrast, he
posits the necessity of contingency, a point we will return to in what follows.
Why begin with this text about Descartes with Meillassoux? As mentioned above, the
incursion of Après challenges the future of Continental philosophy, or to put it less
dramatically, it aims to radically upend what was hitherto accepted as philosophical truth
since Kant. Psychoanalytically inclined philosophers, and others working in what is
called “Transcendental Materialism,”6 have responded to Meillassoux’s call to abandon

Indeed, when thinking the “union” (of body and soul) in a novel way, it is the irreducibility between pure corporeality
and pure thought that forces Descartes to invent a “third primitive notion,” that he expounds in The Passions of the
Soul. A text that is often ignored, and is rarely considered to be canonically expressive of Descartes’ philosophy,
despite the fact that some Cartesian scholars consider it to be the acme of Descartes’ philosophical enterprise. As
Geneviève Rodis-Lewis writes: “From metaphysical roots, through physiology and its action in the union with the soul,
and through the soul’s reaction to it, the treatise offers the most complete branch of the Cartesian philosophy, and its
ripest fruit,” Rodis-Lewis, The Passions of the Soul, xxv.
5

For an overview of this movement in thought see Adrian Johnston’s work, in particular, his Prolegomena to Any
Future Materialism (2013).
6
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the transcendental, with a defense of the subject. Yet, to understand Meillassoux, it is
important for us to understand how he reads Kant. This question enables us to pin down
which register Meillassoux is working in. Malabou’s critique, which is only briefly
outlined here, belongs to the portion of “Transcendental Materialist” critics who are
involved in this debate. The following section will address the particular partisan twist
that Lacanian philosophers offer us in their critique. In response to how Meillassoux
reads Kant, he assumes the first of the Kantian approaches to the transcendental, such that
this first approach, or interpretation, is opposed to the Copernican turn, in the sense that
Kant’s position is actually against the Copernican “decentering” of the subject in the
cosmos. By contrast, a second approach places its emphasis, on the status of the subject,
not the shift (or lack thereof) in the “substantial Center” (to use Žižek’s formulation).
This passage from the Critique of Pure Reason makes clear the second approach:
We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the
celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming
that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process,
and tried the experiment of assuming that the speculator revolved, while the stars
remained at rest (Kant, 21).
Kant argues that it is the subject qua spectator who must revolve around the stars. Žižek
interprets the approach in the above passage as introducing Kantian apperception: an
operation that erodes the substantive (self)identity of the subject, whereby the subject is
reduced to a substanceless void, as Descartes formulates with res cogitans, reducing the
subject to a minimal point.7 The thesis of this section holds that it is against
Meillassoux’s reading of Kantian transcendentalism that we can qualify Lacan’s return to
Freud as precisely Kantian insofar as Freud’s “Copernican turn” is not a simple

Recalling Kant’s argument from the CPR: “Of this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented
than a transcendental subject of the thoughts= x,” Kant, A346, 414. Žižek’s interpretation in Tarrying with the Negative
articulates in a salient way Kant’s criticism of Descartes in a perspicuous way: “This gap which separates the empirical
I’s self experience from the I of transcendental apperception coincides with the distinction between existence qua
experiential reality and existence qua logical construction i.e, existence in the mathematical sense (“there exists an X
which…”). The status of Kant’s I of transcendental apperception is that of a necessary and simultaneously impossible
logical construction (“impossible” in the precise sense that its notion can never be filled out with intuited experiential
reality), in short: of the Lacanian real. Descartes’ error was precisely to confuse experiential reality with logical
construction qua the real-impossible,” 14.
7
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displacement of the subject, or a “decentering,” but rather transforms the very concept of
the subject as such. Furthermore, Lacan radicalizes the Freudian position with the sujet
barré, or “split,” that is constitutive of speaking subjects. The barred subject is borne out
of the maelstrom of self-relating negativity that divides the subject in language. What is
striking is that Lacan argues that this split subject originates in Descartes. This chapter’s
aim is to demonstrate how Descartes, Freud, and Lacan are imbricated theoretically and
more specifically, to uncover the impetus behind Lacan’s claim that the Freudian subject
of the unconscious is Cartesian.8 Curiously, Meillassoux’s reading of both Descartes and
Kant sidesteps the more speculative aspects of the French and German traditions. What is
missed in his reading is the kernel which links Descartes to Lacan. The wager of this
chapter is to assert that, it is not enough to consider “the world Kant left us,” we must go
back further, and begin our inquiry with the subject of modernity that is inaugurated by
Descartes.9
Before moving into Lacanian territory, it seems necessary to take Meillassoux seriously
at his most speculative. While his critique of “correlationism” centers on the limitation
that Kant places on the (un)knowability of the Thing-in-itself, he criticizes Kant’s
emphasis on experience. In a “Hegelian tour de force,”10 Meillassoux argues that the
presumed limitations are actually “experiences of absolute facticity,” such that we must
sidestep the “perennial deficiency in [the] thought” about reason as such. Meillassoux
argues that what we thought to be an experience of limitation (i.e., self-limitation) is
actually the ultimate property of the Thing-in-itself, or the noumenal, to which Kant
forbids the subject access: “he [Kant] annuls every idea of an in-itself that differs from
the correlationist structure of the subject” (Meillassoux, 56). Meillassoux claims that the

8

For Lacan, the unconscious is a central concept, hence the title of Seminar XI. To briefly remind us of its particular
definition and function: “The unconscious is constituted by the effects of speech on the subject, it is the dimension in
which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, consequently the unconscious is structured
like a language,” 149.
In “The World Kant Left Us,” Hannah Arendt designates the “world” as the existential void left by Kant, a world that
is picked up by Heidegger, Sartre and so on. The play here seeks to signal that the void is always already in Descartes,
and concerns not only the existential “being,” but the logic of being (which includes fantasy).
9

Apropos “Hegelian tour de force,” this is Žižek’s qualification, which is highly “charitable,” and reminds us to take
Meillassoux’s speculative gesture seriously, and to venture beyond him. This section is indebted to Žižek’s critique of
Meillassoux in Less Than Nothing.
10
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Idealist makes the In-itself structurally impossible for the subject to access, thus placing
upon himself a limitation as such, rather than positing that, under this aegis, the In-itself
is unknowable for-us as Idealist subjects. When the speculative philosopher (the “final
disputant”) speaks in the text, Meillassoux argues that neither the dogmatist nor the
idealist have “identified” the absolute, which he describes as “the capacity-to-be other,” a
“possible transition” (Ibid.). The crux of the argument holds that, in order to trespass
against the correlation, one must be able to think beyond the subjective horizon.
Meillassoux’s “speculative thesis” (which he opposes to the “metaphysical thesis”) is
most profound when he argues that:
The correlationist does the opposite of what she says, she says that we can think
that a metaphysical thesis, which narrows the realm of possibility might be true,
rather than the speculative thesis, which leaves this realm entirely open; but she
can only say this by thinking an open possibility, where no eventuality has any
more reason to be realized than any other. This open possibility, this ‘everything is
equally possible’, is an absolute that cannot be de-absolutized without being
thought as absolute once more (Meillassoux, 58 emphasis mine). Here, an
epistemological deadlock becomes an ontological thesis.
When Meillassoux asks: “How are you able to think this ‘possibility of ignorance,’ he
argues that “The truth is that you are only able to think this possibility of ignorance
because you have actually thought the absoluteness of this possibility, which is to say, its
non-correlationist character” (Meillassoux, 58). In Less Than Nothing, Žižek unpacks
Meillassoux’s move which grants the subject access to the absolute. If it is possible,
writes Žižek, for us to “think our knowledge of reality (the way reality appears to us) as
having radically failed, as radically different from the Absolute, then this gap (between
the For-us and In-itself) must be part of the Absolute itself” (Žižek, 636). What appears
(to us) as radically inaccessible to experience is in fact a feature of the Absolute as such.
Under this view, “the very feature that seemed forever to keep us away from the Absolute
is the only feature which directly unites us with the Absolute” (Ibid.). Žižek’s
intervention is decisively Lacanian when he argues that Meillassoux’s central claim—that
contingency is the only necessity—issues from the position of enunciation that belongs to
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the “masculine side” of the Lacanian formulae of sexuation. Such that “according to the
logic of universality and its constitutive exception: everything is contingent—with the
exception of contingency itself, which is absolutely necessary” (Žižek, 636-7). However,
Žižek’s second critique is more important for our purposes here, because he argues that
Meillassoux remains trapped within the Kantian problem of inaccessibility; the
inaccessibility of the Thing looms over his argument such that he fixates on the
subjective barring by experience. Žižek argues that there is a “third” option, which
radicalizes the speculative aspect in Meillassoux.
Žižek brings to the fore an example concerning the relationship between desire and drive,
which may help us understand this “third” option. He writes:
The object of the drive is not related to the Thing as a filler of the void: the drive
is literally a counter-movement to desire, it does not strive toward impossible
fullness [...] the drive is quite literally the very “drive” to break the All of
continuity in which we are embedded, to introduce a radical imbalance into it, and
the difference between drive and desire is precisely that, in desire, this cut, this
fixation onto a partial object, is as it were “transcendentalized” (Žižek, 640).
Desire, which Žižek links to the Kantian position, is disturbed by the “Hegelian” drive.
At this point, it should be clear that the subject of Meillassoux’s critique of
correlationism is not the subject of Lacanian psychoanalysis, or even contemporary
(Continental) philosophy. This subject has no relation to the pre-subjective Real that
curves the symbolic space that is “always already” inscribed without us; thus, the subject
is symbolically inscribed prior to its emergence on the (correlationist) scene. Žižek
argues, “It is not enough to oppose to transcendental correlation a vision of reality-initself—transcendental correlation itself has to be grounded in reality-in-itself…”
Conversely, Meillassoux remains trapped in the Kantian concern for the inaccessible
Thing in itself, rather than to locate the very Thingness within reality as such, which is
“pre-subjective,” in the precise sense that it is antecedently imposed onto the subject.
Žižek puts it pointedly when he says: “the true problem that follows from Meillassoux's
basic speculative gesture (transposing the contingency of our notion of reality into the
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Thing itself) is not so much what more we can say about reality-in-itself, but how our
subjective standpoint and subjectivity fit into reality” (Žižek, 643). The problem is no
longer how the objective reality of the Thing-in-itself is inaccessible to us, but rather how
this Thing permeates reality, and how subjectivity is already inscribed by this operation.
Thus, Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism—that the subject, in order to think reality,
must be locked into the correlate (subject-reality)—misses the mark of the Lacanian
“Real.” As Žižek puts it, “This is what truly escapes correlation, not the In-itself of the
object, but the subject as object” (644). The way that Meillassoux fashions his critique
assumes a homogenous link between subject and reality. In contrast, the Lacanian
position holds that there is an inaccessible kernel within the subject herself that is blotted
out for the Meillassouxian subject. The split that Lacan introduced is forfeited, in order to
posit a normative subject (as One, or Whole) of philosophy. The problem of the subject
in Meillassoux is that he fails to properly account for the “theory” of the subject since
Lacan, which is surprising, considering Alain Badiou’s prefatory essay. Continental
philosophy cannot emerge unaffected from this attack, whereby its central discursive
formations, its Master concepts, are put on the rack, and ordered to be destroyed. What it
can do, however, is to go further than Meillassoux, to open the wound borne out of
Meillassoux’s challenge, and to bore a deeper hole. Thus, one finds that a more radical
critique of “correlationism” can already be found in Lacan. The split introduced by Lacan
demonstrates how the philosophical task is not to overcome the inaccessible In-itself, but
rather to relate the In-itself to the split in the subject: to locate the kernel of the Thing
within us.
If we abandon the transcendental, we lose the irreducible kernel of negativity that is
constitutive of both the subject and reality. This (non)relation is what Žižek terms the
“non-correlationist” aspect that Meillassoux misses. The third position that Žižek
sketches seeks to include the Impossible/Real as “principles” of reality as such. What will
break the solipsistic circle of correlationism is the hole that bores from within the subject,
which marks the very presence of the Thing. Thus, we find the emergence of the nonsubstantive cogito, which requires a radical shift in the subject (position) of enunciation
and marks the inauguration of the subject of modernity. Following Descartes’
enunciation of the cogito, the cogito becomes a “spectral impossible object,” which
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haunts philosophy, carrying with it a logic that has been scarcely understood. The aegis
of this thinking will enable us to understand the constitutive redoubling, and thus
re(positing) of the correlation qua negative correlation: the split subject and the
Impossible/Real (Žižek, 645). Lacan’s (re)formulation of Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum”
into “I am at that impossible piece of the real where I cannot think,” reveals that the
subject is not carefully situated between two lacks (constitutive/Other), but rather
emerges by way of a much more paradoxical space (of the Real).11 It is in the place of the
subject that speaking about the unconscious takes form. This is the place whereby the
inquiry into the precise meaning of the subject must begin. How should we “open” the
question of the subject? By foreclosure. If we follow Descartes, is it not the foreclosure
of the subject, the emptying out of particular content that makes possible the emergence
of the cogito? Lacan is correct to note that Descartes did not have a conception of the
subject (or “theory” as Badiou puts it).12 What Descartes did know is that the “subject”
involved a plunge into certainty, and the destruction of previous knowledge. Descartes
sought to erect a new edifice: the universal mathematics accessible to all thinking
subjects, the res cogitans. Descartes’ introduction of the cogito has proven to be
somewhat indestructible qua subjective formation. To this end, it is important to instill—
to register—the essential point that the Cartesian cogito is a formulation that shifts the
(subjective) position of enunciation. This instance represents the “rarity” of such
subjective formations, as Badiou reminds us. The decision to read Descartes in this light
affords the possibility of launching the speculative inquiry of this project. The task of
reading the cogito with, or through, Lacan, requires a demonstration, and perhaps a
deepening of the relation between the cogito and the unconscious.
Lacan’s Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964)
introduces the central discursive formations that make psychoanalytic theory possible: the
unconscious, repetition, transference, and the drives. This text, despite Lacan’s elliptical
tendencies, is in no way a propaedeutic. Lacan seizes the opportunity to posit what is, for
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Lacan’s formulation in Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 20.
See Badiou’s 1982 Théorie du sujet (Theory of the Subject).
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his system, the head, heart, and torso of psychoanalysis: the structure of signification. In
order to bolster this structure, Lacan uses the above-mentioned conceptual elaborations to
pose, and simultaneously answer the question, what is the status of psychoanalysis? This
question can be further qualified to specify whether psychoanalysis is science, or not. For
our purposes, emphasis will be placed on the concept of the unconscious, though
repetition and the drive will also be discussed in some detail. Furthermore, what is sui
generis about this text is that Lacan explicitly takes up Descartes and brings to light a
previously unthought partnership between Cartesian philosophy and Freudian
psychoanalysis. To this end, Lacan seeks to understand both the subjective formation and
what precedes it, so that, before any experience of “individual deduction,” certain
relations are (always) already determined. This claim must be understood as a structural
claim. Lacan notes that when we can think about the phenomenon of the count, the
operation of counting includes the retroactive moment of recognition whereby I (the one
who thinks) recognize myself as the one who counts, and thus, I am counted. To make
this point more clearly, Lacan writes: “The important thing for us, is that we are seeking
here-before any formation of the subject, of a subject who thinks, who situates himself in
it- the level at which there is counting, things are counted, and in this counting he who
counts is already included. It is only later that the subject has to recognize himself as
such” (Lacan, 20).
This point suggests that there is a retroactive or belated aspect to subjective formation. If
we consider the relation between the subject and the unconscious, we may find some
clarity. What is the unconscious, that is, what is its status and/or function? To arrive at
this point, Lacan refers to the concept of cause, as understood by Kant. For Kant, there is
a constitutive gap that attaches itself to cause. To speak of cause means to carry forward
something that is indefinite and anti-conceptual. Lacan closes the discussion with an
enigmatic statement: “In short, there is cause only in something that doesn’t work”
(Lacan, 22). As Lacan notes, c’est depuis toujours ce problème de la cause qui est
l’embarras des philosophes…Cause, like masochism, is linked to embarrassment (what
Kraft-Ebbing termed “masochism” was something more fundamental to the structure of
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bondage and humiliation, notes Deleuze).13 Cause is the bondage of philosophical
thought.
However, in terms of causality, the unconscious does not simply determine neuroses, but
rather reveals a gap: “For what the unconscious does is to show us the gap through which
neurosis recreates a harmony with a real—a real that may well not be determined”
(Lacan, 22). Lacan describes the function of neurosis, not as filling the gap, but of
covering the surface, like a scar “covers” a wound. However, the scar, and its irreducible
remainder, the tissue, is not the neurosis itself, but the unconscious. As Lacan notes, the
scar belongs to the “order of the non-realized.” How the unconscious operates is
described rather obliquely, as that which is held in suspense, which remains “unborn”
(non-née), intermingled with repression which surges forward in this in-between space.
Lacan writes: c’est le rapport aux limbes de la « faiseuse d’anges »; It is the abortionist’s
relation to limbo (Ibid, 23). This difficult phrase makes explicit the structural relation
with the order of the “non-realized;” there exists, within the space of this particular
topology entities which are “unborn,” or dwelling between modalities. To invoke this
enigmatic space, the “zone of shades,” as Lacan puts it. When we speak of subjects in the
psychoanalytic register, we attempt to puncture the “navel of the dreams,” as Freud puts
it, the unknown center of the subject, the constitutive gap. Lacan warns that this discourse
is disruptive, and invokes Nietzsche’s “pathos of distance,” to illuminate this point. The
severity of Lacan’s tone for this seminar is relative to its context, for it was given
following Lacan’s “excommunication,” which he dramatically, though not unreasonably
links to Spinoza’s excommunication. This messy unknown, as Freud insisted, “had been
forgotten,” and thus it is against positivist psychology that Lacan is working in order to
make space for this abyssal dimension of the subject. At this juncture, it seems incumbent
to pin down precisely what Lacan means by the subject.
The Cartesian Subject
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Early Lacan was undoubtedly influenced by Heidegger, and other philosophers who
sought to tear down any philosophical system, or trace, that issued from the cogito. We
must take notice that the introduction of the “indestructible” distinction between the ego’s
“I” and the subject, marks the instance where Lacan makes room for the cogito in his
thought. As Mladen Dolar notes, the splitting of the ego and the subject coincides with
the distinct registers of the Imaginary (the place of the ego) and the Symbolic (the place
of the subject) (Dolar, 12). Dolar traces the discursive scene brought to the fore which is
at odds with Lacan’s (re)introduction of the subject, whereby structuralism, in searching
for anterior causes, snuffed the subject, considering this formation as self-deceptive, a
“necessary illusion.” Structuralism was hunting for the conditions that produce the
subject, while also breaking away from the humanism of previous philosophy.
Conversely, Lacan situates the subject, inextricably linked to the unconscious, within a
structure; as the dictum goes, “the unconscious is structured like a language.”
Psychoanalysis, against the anonymous world of historicism posits that any process,
structure, or system must necessarily be linked to the subject. As Dolar notes, for Lacan,
that which is “non-subjective” is “always already subjectivized,” meaning that the
presuppositions of philosophy that issue from the cogito, are stained by subjectivity,
though lacking the particular language, or moment to designate the subject. But, as Lacan
notes in Seminar XI, the subject was “waiting there since Descartes,” which is what
enables him to claim that the cogito is the subject of the unconscious. The return to Freud
carried with it an implicit—now made explicit—corollary: a return to Freud necessarily
implicates Descartes. The subject that psychoanalysis takes up is the subject of modern
science. Thus, Freud’s subject is Cartesian.14
What is particular to Lacan’s notion of the subject is that, unlike previous conceptions of
the subject, non-recognition is the point of the subject’s emergence. As Dolar notes, all
formations of the unconscious follow this thread: “they are accompanied by a ‘this is not

In Seminar XI, when Lacan says that Freud’s method is explicitly Cartesian, this suggests that Freud, following
Descartes, reduces the relation between subject and knowledge manifest in the figure, or the name, of the cogito. The
reduction of subjectivity to consciousness has continued since Descartes (with Husserl, and Sartre for instance), and
Lacan argues that psychoanalysis attempts to re-establish the essential gap between these two entities. However, the
ruptural nature of this discovery—of the unconscious—reveals that the truth of the existence of the subject (for both
Freud and Descartes) requires an Other, or something other than the transparency secured by reason.
14
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me,’ ‘I was not there,’ although they were produced by the subject him/herself (or to put
it in the terms of the cogito: they cannot be followed by a ‘therefore I am’).” Here, Dolar
emphasizes that the topology of the subject contains an “alien kernel,” which disrupts the
space of the subject; there is a “breakdown, in certain points, of the constituted horizon of
recognition and sense” (Dolar, 14). If psychoanalysis is indeed a science, its “object” is
the subject in its objectal dimension.
There are two Lacanian accounts of the subject, the first being the subject of illusion. If
we follow Descartes’ procedure in the Meditations, the cogito self-evacuates, leaving a
“pure vanishing point without a counterpart.” Furthermore, Dolar writes:
It is questionable whether this yields the subject of thought—Descartes himself
considered alternative suggestions of “I doubt, I err, I lie,” etcetera, ergo sum, the
minimal form of which is “I enounce, ergo sum.” One has to entrust oneself to the
signifier, yet the subject that is at stake has no signifier of its own, it is the subject of
enunciation, absent from and underlying what is enunciated.
Dolar is correct to note that Lacan attempted to avoid the mess of the cogito in Seminar
XI, but highlights a “fact that Descartes forgets,” namely, that the Cartesian “I think” can
only be formulated by saying (Ibid.). The empty spot that is produced by the subject’s
self-evacuation affords the positing of the universal that reduces the subject to a minimal
point of certainty. This is the subjective form that (positivist) science strives toward. A
subjectivity that is empty, universal, and leached of any substantive content. However,
Descartes did not leave this space empty. As Dolar reminds us, he covered over the gap
with the res cogitans, his act of “substantialization.” Lacan, by contrast, aims to pin down
the subject in the emptiness of the “set” (a point I will return to in discussing
formalization in the Second Chapter), while Descartes’ concern primarily issues from the
question of how one can proceed from the vanishing point. As we know, his decision was
a recourse to the big Other, God, and thus, knowledge is always God’s. God becomes the
decisionary subject, the “vaster” subject, “the subject supposed to know, God” (Lacan,
224). In Lacanian terms, the guarantee afforded by the big Other makes possible the de-
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barring of the subject. Descartes was, in his time, highly criticized for the circularity of
his argument, a circulus in demonstrando…
Lacan describes two possible readings of the cogito in Seminar XI, and we will
begin with the subject in relation to a “forced choice,” which engenders a loss of being.
Choice is subtended by loss. When one chooses x, one loses y, and vice versa. What
Lacan is suggesting that choice itself is stained by loss. The cogito, rather than standing
in for the humanist subject, is without freedom of choice. Lacan’s example of the “la
bourse ou la vie,” drives this point. The “choice” is “your money or your life,” which
entails a loss of being despite what the subject chooses. The cogito’s (forced) choice is
coloured by an asymmetry and irreducible loss which could be articulated as: “your
thought or your being,” as Dolar puts it (Dolar, 18). Thinking, according to Lacan, entails
a certain loss of being, and thus the corollary is: being requires that one does not think.
From this, we can articulate being in terms of pretension. The forced choice is thus:
cogito or sum. Lacan ultimately sides with thought. However, his later accounts of the
cogito are highly suggestive of the other side; he might eventually side with being.
Descartes chooses the loss of being in pursuit of the “I think,” such that being is
(presumed to be) deduced from thought. However, as previously mentioned, being does
not follow from thought, but is diminished by it. Without the support of the signifier, the
subject becomes an empty point of enunciation. Conversely, the subject that chooses
being can no longer claim the status of subject in the stricto sensu. As Lacan writes, “if
we choose being, the subject disappears, it eludes us, it falls into non-sense. If we choose
sense, the sense survives only deprived of that part of non-sense that is...the unconscious”
(Lacan, 211). Thus, if we choose being (an “impossible” choice), we lose the signifier; if
we choose “sense,” i.e., reason, we lose the constitutive element of subjectivity that
issues from the unconscious. Thus, we are left, in the Cartesian scheme, with a sense
(reason) that is cut off from the unconscious, though necessarily stained by it. The
decision ultimately rests on two seemingly unsavoury qualities force or impossibility.
However, the subject’s “place” is in the formal empty set that issues from the impossible
choice. Things become paradoxical here. Dolar clarifies the wager noting that, if the
subject belongs to the empty set, “[...] the forced choice is not simply an absence of

19

choice: choice is offered and denied at the same time, but its empty alternative is what
counts for the subject” (Dolar, 20, emphasis mine).15
The Lacanian cogito turns out to be the repressed side of thought, which “haunts it.” The
lament against the cogito as alienated from its being, in this instance, misses the mark.
The point, for Lacan, is that the cogito can maintain itself, only by maintaining this lost
aspect. As ever, Dolar makes things much clearer: “it is maintained only through this
repression. It emerges only through the impossibility of integrating this lost part, the
intersection where sense and being would seemingly coincide and ground the subject”
(Dolar, 21). This impossible integration emerges with the cogito, as its l’envers invisible.
To this end, the Lacanian subject is indeed structured like the cogito.
Yet there are two conceptions of the cogito within Lacan’s discourse. I have now outlined
the first sense of the cogito that appears in Lacan, from Seminar XI. The second sense is
opposed to the cogito as the subject of the unconscious. This “other” cogito is found in
Seminar XIV, La logique de la fantasme (the Logic of Fantasy, 1966-67), a scarcely
translated text. In shifting from the Symbolic register to the Imaginary, this seminar
focuses on the logic of fantasy, which confronts the subject with being. If the
unconscious is understood as the locus of “thought without being,” an empty place
whereby universality slips in, the “I,” which follows from this empty universality is void
of subjective content. Conversely, the logic of fantasy produces a different wager, and the
fundamental choice for the subject becomes: by choosing being I must forfeit thought. Je
ne pense pas pour être; I don’t think, therefore I am. To be, I must not think. However,
the trouble of the unconscious does not resolve. In choosing being without thought, the
exclusion of thought comes to be “the exclusion of thought as unconscious, of the
unconscious as thought” (Dolar, 28). It is worth noting that fantasy is the only portal to
the Real, and thus the incursion of jouissance becomes functions in a similar way to the
unconscious. As being takes center stage in this conception of the cogito, it is important
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to understand what being means in this case. Being is not ontic for Lacan, it is not the
“being” of scientific objectivity that can be manipulated by the “naughty thumb of
science,” but rather, it belongs to a certain philosophical finger, less prurient than the
empiricist’s.16 It is being that is irreducible to objectivity, and to the (imaginary)
counterpart of consciousness that we are dealing with (Dolar, 26). This being, as it
confronts a piece of the Real, attempts to cover itself with fantasy. To this end, what is
“at stake” in fantasy is the “choice of being” that manages to grasp, or “pin down,” one’s
jouissance (Ibid.). This realm of fantasy lacks the operations of signification that provide
the subject with the requisite signifying support, and thus the status of this being is non
signifiable. The name for this being is termed “le complement d’être,” which carries lack
and object, two sides which do not form a whole.
As previously mentioned, the unconscious slips in despite the shield of fantasy. As Dolar
puts it: “the choice of being relegates the ‘I’ to the underpinnings of the Imaginary (the
false being of fantasy) and to the drives, while the emergence of the subject results from
the second step, the intrusion of the unconscious” (Dolar, 35). The incursion of the
unconscious is where the subject becomes subject. The subject is alienated from herself,
in the precise sense that the Imaginary being of the “I” is supported by the “grammar of
the drives.” It is true that the unconscious is the thing who speaks (ça parle); however,
the drives, in their “silent manner,” have a particular way of staining the field, as with the
signifying order. By grammar, Lacan refers to a kind of syntactical relation that structures
the field of being. Masculine being takes form as res cogitans, the pure thinking thing,
which turns out to be “a false being of the ‘I’ framed by fantasy”; yet, this
acknowledgement does not suffice; we must locate what is prior to being, the “stain of
the sum” (36).
To locate this “prior” moment, is to look at both instances of the cogito as united at a
certain point, where the spheres or registers overlap. What unites the seemingly opposed
readings of the cogito is their meeting place: the impossible intersection of thought and
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being “in” the Real. This shared point of convergence will provide a model for us herein,
and in particular this model will enable us to think through the formulas of sexuation and
the philosophical problematic of sexual difference. The Real suggests that no entity,
which includes both conceptions of the cogito, can avoid castration as such, thus uniting
them in this paradoxical space. The Real unites the drives (the two aspects that pertain to
the “I,” the space of the Imaginary) and desire (that which pertains to the unconscious,
the Symbolic). Lacan argues that it is the objet a that marks the medial point which unites
both desire and the drives which orbit around it. While I would like to venture further
into this discussion, it will suffice to say (for now) that the seemingly “opposed” cogitos
should be read as revealing a progression in Lacan’s thought, a movement toward the
discoveries that can be found in Seminar XX, pertaining to feminine sexuality and the
formulas of sexuation. We will explore these issues in more depth in the next chapter.
Is Psychoanalysis a Science?
In order to broach the question of whether psychoanalysis is, or is not, a science, I will
respond with Lacan’s own formulation, that psychoanalysis is a “conjectural science of
the subject” or a “science of the unconscious.”17 Lacan will later qualify (specifically in
Seminar XX) that psychoanalysis is a discourse, and indeed, a praxis. Freud himself was
unambiguous on this point. Freud affirmed the status of psychoanalysis as a science of
the unconscious.18 For him, the lines of demarcation are not drawn in the way that Lacan
distinguishes between “conjectural” and “positive” science. The former is akin to the
Foucauldian concept of the “human sciences,” and the latter is the domain which purports
to have the sole access to truth: the “objective sciences.” Critique of the “positivist”
science can be found throughout the twentieth century, whereby rationalism is
distinguished from positivism. It is important to note that both Freud and Lacan affirmed
the status of psychoanalysis qua science. The need to return to Freud is subtended by a
return to Descartes, as the discourses that issue from their respective works concern the
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modern subject. Lacan goes so far as to claim that psychoanalysis operates only as the
subject of science.19
Freud, avant la lettre, understood the significance of the operativity of the signifier in
relation to the unconscious. Lacan remarks that Freud discovered the signifier before the
scientists (the linguists). It is from this, that Lacan seeks to radicalize his position, and to
push it to its discursive limit. Freud’s concept of the unconscious is sui generis, insofar
that it does not belong to the Romantic notion of the unconscious (linked to the
imagination), nor the psychological. Rather, Freud’s unconscious (as there are indeed
competing conceptions of the unconscious) can be found in its inextricable relationship to
the miasma of fractured concepts that ground the theoretical system of psychoanalysis
that we have discussed: unconscious, desire, split, inhibition. As Lacan writes in Seminar
XI: “What occurs, what is produced, in this gap, is presented as the discovery. It is in this
way that the Freudian exploration first encounters what occurs in the unconscious”
(Lacan, 25). Lacan introduces two further concepts to prime the pedagogical scene,
namely discontinuity and loss. There is a dimension of loss that is constitutive of the
unconscious as such, as Lacan writes: “one lost, ten to be found again,” which
exemplifies the oscillatory movement of the unconscious. The discontinuity at play is the
operative vacillation, which slips between recovery and loss. However, one is correct to
wonder, discontinuity from what? What provides the backdrop to this analysis, if not
totality? This question necessarily bears on ontology: “is the One anterior to
discontinuity?” Here, Lacan breaks with the ontology that figures the “closed One” as the
proper beginning for metaphysical inquiry. This break cannot be underestimated and will
figure predominantly in discussing the formation of the subject. The One for Lacan (un)
becomes the German prefix Un, a negation of oneness (Lacan, 26). Lacan introduces the
notion of Unbegriff, which should not be understood as a non-concept, but rather as lack,
understood as not-One.

“To say that the subject on which we operate in psychoanalysis can be no other than the subject of science, may
appear as a paradox.” Logic of Phantasy, translation of this passage is by Mladen Dolar, from “Cogito as the Subject of
the Unconscious.” Dolar, however, notes that he will “leave aside the cardinal problem of the relationship between
psychoanalysis and science,” 38.
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In discussing the breach with the “closed One,” psychoanalysis is concerned with the
subject qua indetermination: it concerns what takes place at the level of enunciation (the
subjective symbolic space), which makes possible, “in an operatory way, for something
to take on the function of barring” (Ibid.). The function of barring represents an
effacement, which we will explore in the Lacanian algebra. The barring function should
be understood as an act of effacement, whereby it strikes out the signifier as such. This
space, whereby effacement is enacted, is the “here” which Lacan designates as the place
of the unconscious and its “dynamism” (Lacan, 27). Lacan concludes: “Thus, the
unconscious is always manifested as that which vacillates in a split in the subject, from
which emerges a discovery that Freud compares with desire […]” The space of this
conjuncture affords us to situate this concept of “desire” in the “denuded metonymy” of
the discourse “in question” (28). This “space” leaves room for the subject to encounter
the experience of surprise, a delight in confusion, and non-transparency. Lacan writes, at
this juncture, that we may situate the concept of the unconscious as that which
“vacillates” in a split in the subject producing a desire. Desire can thus situate itself
within the “denuded metonymy” of the discourse in question (psychoanalysis). This
enigmatic phrase, Lacan notes, entails something of a surprise for the subject (Ibid.).
Freud escapes idealism by focusing his attention on the discourse of the other, the
hysteric’s discourse. The discourse of the unconscious and desire is inextricable from the
question hovering around sexual difference. Freud’s provocative, and for him,
irresolvable, at least in his lifetime, question—Was Will Das Weib? It is through the
analysis of the Other’s desire, as supported by the discourse of the hysteric that Lacan
follows this thread, radicalizing the Freudian position, which ultimately fortifies his own,
emboldening him to postulate that Woman does not exist.
We should understand the postulation of the non-existence (non-relation) of Woman, in
parallel with Lacan’s articulation of the structure of the gap that bores holes in the
symbolic space. In Seminar XI, the section “Of the Subject of Certainty” elaborates on
Lacan’s argument of the structuring function of lack. In relation to desire, which Lacan
designates for speaking subjects as a manque-a-être (want-to-be). Manque becomes the
word for lack, signaling both at once a desire to be and a lack of being (what one desires

24

to be). This structure (the structuring function of lack) has a subjectivizing force, which is
precisely why Lacan calls it “ontological,” lack is an ontological function.
Lacan writes: “The gap of the unconscious may be said to be pre-ontological” (Lacan,
29). The gap is pre-ontological as it is situated in the liminal space between being and
non-being; the gap “belongs” to the order of the un-realized, a modality of the possible,
but not (yet) actual. Freud’s infernal discovery, which Lacan notes, draws out and makes
actual the line from Virgil: Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta move.20 Freud’s
discovery raised the waters of “this world,” the infernal river threatening to spill over.
Discovery tends toward dis-order. Lacan reminds us that we should not underestimate the
opening caused by Freud’s discovery, which has now been absorbed, or “asepticized.”
This site of infernal opening is where the element of surprise still lingers, which begs us
to continue our questioning.
In response to the question, “what may be left to chance?” Freud’s response is: “nothing.”
Freud’s method is Cartesian in the precise sense that it begins with the subject of
certainty. To arrive at this proposition, Lacan guides us through Freud’s text. In the
chapter on forgetting (XII) in the Interpretation of Dreams Freud’s bon mot is not truth,
but certainty. This Gewissheit comes to be through doubt. Doubt emerges from the
transmission of the dream as the split between the experience of the dream and what is
recounted. Upon waking, doubt is the sign that suggests that there is something worth
preserving from the dream. Here, Lacan suggests that there is a dialectical relation
between Gewissheit (certainty) and Verkleidung (disguise). This invites us to think about
how the subject, through the process of analysis, uncovers what was “disguised” as
forgetting, as propped up by doubt. For Freud, doubt is a sign of resistance. To put it this
way: by speaking the dream qua omission, the gaps in the memory that the subject
experiences come to the fore qua resistance. However, these holes in the memory may be
recovered through the repetition which occurs in analysis. The holes in the subject’s
memory are both the cause of doubt and the signal that there is something worth
preserving, and this is precisely what enables Lacan to say: Freud’s method is Cartesian.
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Freud’s doubt, as revealed in his own analysis, mirrors the scene of the Meditations; it is
his dreams that are cast into doubt, his memory that is perforated by holes; like Freud, for
Descartes, it is his own body that he casts into doubt. This enables us to say that Freud’s
method is precisely Cartesian in the instant whereby he doubts the transmissibility of his
own dream. At this juncture, we can also say that doubt assures that a thought is “there.”
The “I am” of the dream ensures that there is being.
What Descartes and Freud share is a formal relation, a method that concerns certainty and
begins with the subject. It is my doubt that reveals that a thought is there. Yet, there is
dissymmetry between their respective positions: for Freud, thought belongs to the
unconscious. The subject is “displaced” through the lapse between the hole/gap of the
dream that thwarts the self-identity of the subject. This is why Freud declares that
certainty can be found in the unconscious, thus he hands back truth into the “hands” of
the Other, the rightful owner. Descartes asserts, albeit in a radically different way, that
truth is always God’s truth. In the Cartesian system, truth is guaranteed by a nondeceiving (big) Other. This rhetoric, which is scientific, is not simply about setting forth
facts, but persuading an audience. Aristotle knew this well.21
Science et la verité
Throughout the seminars, Lacan refers to the concept of science. This concept, as it
pertains to the status of psychoanalysis, is most carefully elaborated in Seminar XIII,
“The Object of Psychoanalysis” which straddles the two ventures that expound Lacan’s
competing conceptions of the cogito. At this point, we may conclude that the question of
the status of science is necessarily linked to the question of the subject. The subject is,
after all, the subject of science. Yet, this subject is irreducible to the coordinates
commonly associated with science, such as biological or psychological phenomena, and
thus, Lacan’s conception of the subject, and of science, constitutes an “epistemological
break” with both concepts. The essay that I will read and tarry with most closely in this
section is La science et la verité, an essay that was published in the Cahiers, and later
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appeared in the Écrits, patched together by way of the conceptual labour of Seminars XIXIII. To arrive at the definition of subject, a certain reduction is necessary. The same
reduction was necessary in order to deduce the object of psychoanalysis qua science. As
Lacan writes in the Écrits: “A certain reduction that is necessary that is sometimes long
in completion, but always decisive in the birth of a science; such a reduction truly
constitutes its object” (Écrits, 855). Lacan places himself within the discourse, and thus
history, of science. To this end, we will venture to unearth the features of modern
science, Galilean and Cartesian, which have made possible the modern subject, which
culminate in Freud’s discovery of the unconscious. Lacan argues that, without the
antecedent discoveries of seventeenth science in particular, Freud’s discovery would be
“unthinkable.” Here, the object of psychoanalysis qua science is unequivocally the
subject. Lacan corrects the view that Freud was opposed to the science of his time, a
maverick that found himself in the mar of myth rather than scientific activity. Lacan
places him precisely in the lineage of “scientism” that runs from Galileo to Freud’s own
contemporaries. Save for Newton (a point that Lacan takes from Koyre’s development of
modern science), modern science concerns a subject who has an ambiguous relation to
knowledge.22 This ambiguous relation of the subject (of science) to knowledge is
radicalized in Freud, who introduces the relation of not-knowing as crucial to the science
of psychoanalysis. Freudian science comes to designate “the subsistence of the subject of
not-knowing,” his concept of the unconscious could be translated as such. Lack becomes
a concern for science, a discourse that seeks to suture holes of the world in order to be
Whole.
Lacan’s continued engagement with the cogito appears in the essay, drawing attention to
the cogito’s reduction to a minimal point (res cogitans), which “marks a break with every
assurance conditioned by intuition” (Lacan, 832). The truth that Descartes finds, does not
really belong to him, but a non-deceiving Other. The subject is not “fully there,” nor does
his knowledge belong to him. This dislocation of the subject is highlighted by Freud,
who, in following Descartes, starts out from the “subject of certainty;” their methods

For a detailed account of Lacan’s relation to science, see Lorenzo Chiesa’s 2016 text The Not-Two: Logic and God in
Lacan.
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differ, yet they both conclude that the “subject is at home” in the field of the unconscious.
This enables Lacan to note that there is no “Man” which could fit the proper role of
scientific object, because the ideal “Man,” in the sense of the subject of the “human
sciences,” does not exist. Thus, there are subjective sciences, such as linguistics, set
theory, and logic, which can be employed to formulate the subjective impasses; as
speaking subjects we can verbalize “open sets,” “knots,” we are “castrated,” and so on. It
is not simply that the subjective sciences represent what happens in the world, but rather
there is something already “imprinted” in the symbolic space prior to our speaking. The
mode that Lacan employs in linguistics is particular to the level it contains, such that
there is a distinction between the statement and the position of enunciation. The latter is
significant, as the saying of a particular thing may (in the rarest instance) inaugurate an
age, as the paradigmatic case of the cogito suggests. In the “everyday” sense of the
position of enunciation, it concerns the location of the subject in the symbolic realm, and
it is possible for this position to shift in regard to the enunciation. Otherwise put, there is
something possibly emancipatory about this level of speech.
In returning to science, the argument becomes more complex, surrounding the issue of
cause. Freud’s incursion into the scientific domain attempted to close the space between
knowledge and its transcendent truth, precisely by opening a gap, by the subject could
emerge. Science, when it abandons this gap, takes on the character of a subject that “does
not want to know.” This denial is the cause of sexual difference, which makes the
“relinquishing of the transcendental” a problem for philosophy, as we have seen. What
makes Freud “indestructible” is the imperative he forces upon us. Freud’s dictum: Wo es
war, soll Ich werden functions as a permanent call.23 Psychoanalysis is tasked to enter the
spaces previously abandoned by science, and to o take for its object the excluded entities.
This brings us to another juncture, that is, the function of truth in relation to science.
When Lacan says, “I, truth, speak,” should we read him as a sophist—in the sense of« Je
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In discussing the relation of conscious/unconscious “material”—roughly translated as “where it was, shall I be…”
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parle, donc, je suis », as Barbara Cassin puts it in Jacques le Sophiste24—or shall we read
him qua philosopher, as Badiou insists?25 This formulation draws our attention to the
absence of a “meta-language,” whereby truth could say something truthful about itself
(“telling the truth about truth”). Furthermore, it enables Lacan to say that the
unconscious is “structured like a language,” which reveals, in turn, the “lack of truth
about truth.” This discovery was, according to Lacan, made by Freud, in his
conceptualization of Urverdraengung (primal repression). As Lacan insists, there is
nothing “noumenal” about this lack of truth about truth; we do not need to be granted
access to the noumenal space that we have been barred from since Kant. Conversely, we
must embrace this lack, and attempt to negotiate what it means for us, as speaking
subjects. . Lacan argues that the causal aspects of truth are “veiled” in science. Thus,
psychoanalysis is tasked to put forth a novel conception of truth. When the unconscious
tells “the truth about truth,” this means the causative aspect of truth may be redressed, by
way of its foreclosure. This “forgetting” of the cause, which discourses such as Marxism
and psychoanalysis seek to redress, distinguish between truth as cause and knowledge as
operation. In Écrits, Lacan makes a detour away from this point, but it is a point to which
he returns. The cause is the “whole effect” which stains the structure. By this, one must
understand cause in terms of “material cause.” This is a difficult concept to grasp, not
least because it relies on Aristotle. The attempt to commensurate a discourse based on
speaking subjects with material causality requires a defense. The example of the phallus
might clarify things:
“The signifier is defined by psychoanalysis as acting first of all as if it were
separate from its signification. Here we see the literal character trait that specifies
the copulatory signifier, the phallus, when–arising outside the limits of the
subject’s biological natural–it is effectively (im)printed; it is unable, however, to
be the sign representing sex, the partner’s sex-that is the partner’s biological
sign…” (Écrits, 876).

Cassin’s famous defense of Sophistry and its particular relation to Lacan can be found in Jacques le Sophiste.
Regarding the Debate between Cassin and Badiou, see Zupancic (2017).
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This passage indicates how psychoanalysis is compatible with materialism, though it does
not so appear at first glance. Thus we can think about the phallus as having a “mark,”
such that it imprints the symbolic space. In terms of thinking the signifier in relation to
human life and historical unfolding, the imprinting of the symbolic space may sound
rather abstract, nevertheless it adjudicates the position of the subject (of enunciation). As
such, it is causative and effective, in the sense that structural (non)relations issue from
this function. The structural relation of sex will be the focus of the next chapter. Thus, the
material cause is a kind of “guise”: we are not interested in sex as a form of genitalbiological organization, but in sex as an ontological, and therefore philosophical problem.
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Chapter 2

2

Does the Cogito Have (a) Sex?

Does the cogito have (a) sex? This question, which serves as a starting point for this
chapter, and cannot be addressed expeditiously, concerns the possibility or topos of
thinking sex in relation to the cogito. Is there a place of, or for, sex in Descartes’ thought:
The thought of sex? The sex of thought? This chapter will present two seemingly
counterintuitive theses in attempting to grasp why “sex” has been left out of philosophy,
and specifically, where Descartes places it, or doesn’t. Firstly, the cogito, like sexual
division, or difference, concerns what is common to all human subjects; secondly, the
“de-sexualization” of reality which takes place within (early) modernity, beginning with
Galileo, is precisely what (early) modern philosophy, science, and psychoanalysis share.
It is by way of this gesture that we will explore whether the cogito has (a) sex. This
chapter is heavily indebted to the work of the Slovenian philosopher Alenka Zupančič,
whose inquiry concerning sex and ontology forces us to rethink sexual difference as a
philosophical problem. While Zupančič does not engage Descartes in What is Sex?, this
chapter—in its mode of thinking and style of questioning—is inspired by her text, which
inaugurates a return to the question of ontology and the relationship to sexual difference,
as division.
For Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, sex is, first and foremost, a concept
and not an empirical object, and it is by looking at sex as a concept that we may effort to
understand the fundamental antagonism that psychoanalysis locates in sex qua sexual
division.26 For Zupančič, the antagonism—this describes the contradiction inherent to

Sexuality precedes sexual difference in Freud, in the form of the “sexual drive.” As Zupančič says, “in other words,
at the level of the libido there are not two sexes” (46). The sexual thing (autoeroetic polymorphous perversity) and its
indifference, coupled by the structural gap in the signifying order “produce” sexual difference. Indeed, following this
“causality” sexuality precedes sexual difference, not as a sexed entity however; the “thing” is indeed a-sexual, like the
cogito. It is the socio-symbolic order that “matures” and “splits” sexuality, and also produces sexual difference. One
can understand the process through the following formula: “What splits into two is the very non-existence of the one.”
Sexual difference exists because there is no “second sex,” but rather because sex is the splitting into two of the nonexistent One. Sexuality and sexual difference are inextricably and irreducibly linked to the signifying order.
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sex—is explicitly ontological and penetrates the core of being qua being. Thus, sex
cannot be circumscribed or reduced to the ontic level, as sex represents something more
primary, and thus requires philosophical resources. This “something,” must be considered
in addition to reality, as that which structures it, or contributes to the structural reality
wherein we find ourselves, prior to being. The push toward de-sexualization, the
epistemic tie which links psychoanalysis and philosophy, will be discussed in more depth
in regard to the second thesis.
Sexual difference, which is the name we will use for the fundamental negativity
of sex (though Lacan uses the term “division”) is, counter-intuitively, what binds the socalled sexual “poles” of “masculine” and “feminine,” and their respective discursive
placeholders, be it “man,” “woman,” “male,” or “female.” Otherwise put, sexual
difference is precisely what is common to men and women. We can conclude, from this
analysis that there is no “second sex,” but rather, a shared fundamental negativity which
concerns how the subject subjectivizes this primary negativity.27 This thesis already
troubles many understandings of what sex, or sexual difference is. In contrast to the
discourse on gender, the psychoanalytic account articulates how sexual difference is
coextensive with the symbolic register (language), and it does not suffice to state that
subjects are not “produced or constructed,” nor does it suffice to pin down “woman” as
an abbreviation for a set of overdetermined historical coordinates. The difficulty of this
question is grounded in the fact that sex is, for psychoanalysis, an ontological problem,
which, however paradoxical it may seem, bears on the political in interesting ways. From
the standpoint of psychoanalysis there is a demand which indicts philosophy’s

Cont. Zupančič is correct to highlight that this irreducible link does not mean that sex is a “symbolic construction”
(apropos gender). Rather, it is “real” because it “marks an irreducible limit (contradiction) of the signifying order.”
There is an absence (gap) at the heart of the presence of the signifier. This “produces” sexual difference, 49.
27

This is not a rejection of Simone de Beauvoir, whose work (specifically Le deuxièm esexe, 1949) no doubt influenced
Lacan. The tension between Lacanian psychoanalysis and de Beauvoir’s Second Sex lies in the understanding of the
socio-symbolic in relation to the (onto)logical status of sex. This is all to say that I think there remains theoretical amity
between these two thinkers. The issue at hand concerns the logic of sexuation, as formulated within the “formulas of
sexuation,” which will be discussed at length in this chapter.
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abandonment of sex (as an ontological question), and this includes the recent incarnations
of “new ontologies,” which fail to account for sex in a properly philosophical manner, or
at all.28 In discussing sexual difference as a relation, or non-relation, the analysis of
sexual difference is figured as a split “of the same world.” If we understand sexual
difference as belonging to the “same world,” that splits the subject (into “two”), this
allows us to think through the tropes associated with divided spheres and domains, and
otherwise masculinized and feminized “divisions” within the social and cultural milieu.
This is the premise of a sexualized homogeneity, which not only requires Woman to
exist, but also relies on the notion that these separate “worlds” come together to form a
totality, or unified Whole; thus their division must be properly sexualized for the function
of this homogeneity. One could say that a male dominated society necessarily requires
Woman to exist. Yet, there is nothing “natural” about these divisions which situate
Woman in a particular place. Rather, these divisions are borne out of the construction of
the mythologizing of sexual difference as coextensive with and belonging to a sexual
cosmology. By rejecting the notion of a world divided in this particular way, where
women, as the “second sex,” occupy the particular domain of mythologized femininity
(which is of course is, or was, troubled by feminist theory), philosophy has abandoned
the question of sexual difference and its sexual cosmology in favour of a proto-liberal
humanism, a portal to Enlightenment, which obviates the “woman question,” (as an
ontological question) by abandoning it tout court. Conversely, psychoanalysis offers a
different entry point for thinking about sexual difference. Rather than thinking sexual
difference as something that is particular to women, it may be understood as a brutal
universalism, which is prior to being and structures the symbolic universe of speaking
beings to such an extent that, when we ask, “What is sex?” it slips away; still, the
question remains, “What is sex?”
It bears repeating that for Lacanian psychoanalysis, sex is first and foremost a concept
and not an empirical object. If we are to think sex philosophically it must be thought as a

As I do not have time/space to take up a discussion of these “new ontologies,” my intention is rather to signal the
resurgence of ontology, yet the lack of engagement with the question of sex. See Zupančič’s critique of ObjectOriented Ontology in What is Sex?
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concept, one which bears the mark of a fundamental negativity/antagonism. For
Zupančič, the fundamental antagonism is ontological, and penetrates the core of being
qua being. It cannot be circumscribed or reduced to the ontic level, as sex represents
something more primary. This “something” that is more primary is that which structures
reality, and contributes to the symbolic world wherein we find ourselves (the symbolic
order and its social ties). In order to understand sex as a discursive and ontological
disruption, it is necessary to venture into an analysis of how psychoanalysis conceives of
ontology. For Lacan, ontology is the discourse of the Master (M’ȇtre; maître). This claim
posits the existence of a hierarchy, a ubiquitous asymmetry, which pervades the
discursive space. This enables Lacan to put forth many paradoxical propositions, such as:
there is no sexual relation. What Lacan suggests by putting forth this statement is that the
(ontological) non-relation makes the empirical relation impossible. Furthermore, there is
no signifying relation (no signifying binary; i.e., “Man” “Woman”). However, the
absence of the binary signifier (the relation) does not prevent the tie, but rather, it
deepens the antagonism. This absence (of the binary signifier) dictates the conditions of
what ties us together and how we might negotiate the tensions therein. This “therein”
includes sexual, political, and social ties. This account is highly abstract, yet one can see
the privileged position allotted to sex within psychoanalytic discourse. It is precisely
when sex enters the discussion that paradoxicality and contradiction are put into
formalization. This point I will return to in discussing Lacan’s formulas of sexuation.
To reiterate, the starting point for thinking sex ontologically is that of split subjectivity,
whereby sexual difference (division) is precisely what is shared. This commonality, or
shared antagonism, repudiates the effort to posit equality, for this shared antagonism is
precisely what has been ignored historically. The exclusion, or “privileging” of women is
predicated on the belief that woman exists, in the precise sense that a relation can be
posited. Yet, it is precisely the positing of the relation in terms of a pre-political identity,
exemplified by recourse to the pre-critical sexual cosmology, which leads to political
exclusion. It is not sufficient to dispute the content of the identity, but we must
reformulate the relation as such. Here, one can see that woman exists in the sense of the
identity of femininity. This identity is predicated upon the exclusion of Woman from the
political realm. Perhaps, one could say that the political exclusion of Woman is

34

demonstrative of liberal humanism as such. Rather than filling up or injecting the
identity of Woman with new content, as certain theoretical imperatives suggest, we ought
to think about exclusion as predicated on forcing the relation to exist; the corollary of this
injunction holds that: thinking multiplicity is insufficient. In the case of sex, the split,
which prevents a numerical multiplicity (a singular identity which “becomes” multiple)
from taking place does not concern the empirical half (of the female species).29
Conversely, and somewhat paradoxically, this view suggests that what must be included
is in fact the very core of the split subjectivity, the non-relation. Zupančič’s analysis is
suggestive of a highly unintuitive thesis (for those dwelling in a permissive social space):
that the symbolic realm must inscribe the political with the non-relation. This thesis is
primarily concerned with how the antagonism is inscribed into the political realm.
Societies based on harmony, the ideals of (permissive capitalist) democracy, which
purport to operate relationally (“equally”), are premised on political principles of
equality; yet, these societies are in fact subtended by histories, and in some cases present
use, of slavery, brutal exclusion, oppression; otherwise put, liberal societies are
necessarily riddled by antagonism between “positive” entities.30 In each case, the relation
is affirmed, whether it is “man,” “woman,” “Black,” “worker.” Conversely, the nonrelation is not a simple absence, but a constitutive curving (subversion) of the discursive
space as such. The curve results from the missing element (the non-relation) which
perverts it, by curving the symbolic space. So, the notion of an original or neutral (or,
even equal) ontology is not possible under this view. The social order is grounded in this
operative negativity, and any attempt to disavow this antagonism will subvert the

Why “curving?”:“Apropos the notion of the Real as the substantial Thing, Lacan accomplishes a reversal which is
ultimately the same as the passage from the special to the general theory of relativity in Einstein. While the special
theory already introduces the notion of the curved space, it conceives of this curvature as the effect of matter: it is the
presence of matter which curves the space, i.e. only an empty space would have been non-curved. With the passage to
the general theory, the causality is reversed: far from causing the curvature of the space, matter is its effect, i.e., the
presence of matter signals that the space is curved. What can all this have to do with psychoanalysis? Much more than
it may appear: in the way exactly homologous to Einstein, for Lacan, the Real – the Thing – is not so much the inert
presence which curves the symbolic space (introducing gaps and inconsistencies in it), but, rather, an effect of these
gaps and inconsistencies.” Zizek in How to Read Lacan (italics are mine), 70.
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In thinking the non-relation, I think that Simone Weil’s critique of liberal “rights” discourse is very relevant (see the
Need for Roots). In terms of the “positive entity,” this suggests the existence of numerically whole, self-identical beings
that are in contradiction, rather than emerging from the primary negativity which allows us to situate the (non)relation
between entities which are always already split.
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political potential of thinking this ontology in a productive way. Otherwise put, thinking
ontology in this way invites us to uncover the morass of what is (asymmetrically)
shared. It seems necessary to state that this re-thinking of ontology affords us a rethinking of the political. However, it is not my intention to discuss at length what the
political prospects for such a theory of sexual difference might be, but rather to give a
sense of the possibilities that are coextensive with thinking sexual difference in this
precise (ontological) way.
The frame put forth by Zupančič argues that social antagonism cannot be
conceived of as simply existing between individual elements within the social realm, but
rather, the antagonism is inscribed into the asymmetry of the social space itself. The
social realm bears the mark of non-relation. The antagonism is persistent; however, this
does not mean that political intervention is not possible. Conversely, the disavowal of the
non-relation attempts to smooth over this fundamental negativity. This smoothing over
can be found in early modern and Enlightenment discourses on the equality of the sexes.
In the case of Descartes, the antagonism is disavowed in favour of a positive thesis:
reason is held in common (sensus communis) irrespective of sexual difference.31 In
keeping with the Cartesian hierarchy, it seems necessary to pin down the metaphysics
first (if one can posit this naïve causality).
Making space for the “non-relation”
In order to “locate” the non-relation, it is necessary to gloss the Lacanian purchase
on language and the symbolic order. The signifying order negates, or forecloses, the
possibility of a “binary signifier,” such that this “non-relation” (of the binary signifier)
reveals that the signifying order does not begin with One, but rather a “minus one”
(Zupančič, 42). At this juncture, a double emergence takes place: the emergence of the
signifying order and the non-emergence of the One signifier. Zupančič notes how it is in
the place of this gap, of the emergence of the “minus one,” that both a gap (ontological

First outlined in Aristotle’s De Anima; Descartes, despite his desire to break the Aristotelian-Thomist stronghold,
continues to engage many Aristotelian motifs and concepts. Sensus communis is a structuring principle for Descartes.
Descartes, despite acknowledging differences in strength of soul and intellectual power, argues that everyone, all
thinking subjects, do share the “power to judge well” (Discourse on Method, Part 1: VI, 2: CSM I, 111). Furthermore,
the possibility to be morally inclined is also available to all subjects, as “generosity” is a universal passion.
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minus) and surplus-enjoyment appear within the discursive field. The appearance of
enjoyment is not simply produced but is the trace of the structural antagonism. Under this
view, psychoanalysis locates sexuality not simply “within” the symbolic, but rather as a
“being” that is constituted solely as the contradiction of the discursive symbolic space.
Thus, sexuality cannot exist without this antagonism, this dragging minus one, which is
its “condition of possibility,” so to speak. What can be inferred from this proposition is
not that one must go searching for the missing signifier of sexuality, but rather that this
“missing” is its very existence, its being. This is to say, the existence of sex depends on
this primary lack. Furthermore, it is precisely this primary instance of the “gap” and of
the missing signifier that makes possible the emergence of the signifier. The importance
of sexuality for psychoanalysis can thus be understood not as an attempt to fill the
missing signifier with a new content but as avowing the gap that is constitutive of
sexuality, which makes it an ontological issue, and so an issue for human beings and for
philosophy. Through this antagonism, a “space” is produced by the symbolic order and is
“populated” by beings and entities. However, there is something else, in addition to what
is “produced” by the symbolic order, “inseparable but not created.” This extra something
is described by Zupančič in the following way: “it is not a being: it is discernible only as
a (disruptive) effect within the symbolic field, its disturbance, its bias. In other words, the
emergence of the signifier is not reducible to, or exhausted by, the symbolic” (Zupančič,
41). This is to say that not only is symbolic reality produced by this discursive space, but
also what Lacan calls the Real.
The “Real” can be understood as a reclaiming of what traditional ontology previously cut
off in its quest to capture being qua being, namely the fundamental antagonism that
makes being possible to begin with. The assumption is that being is possible, that it is
numerically “one” engenders a discourse that enables a movement from ontology to
social, historicist, or deconstructive concepts, such as “gender” and the discourses of
multiplicity. Inversely, the Lacanian wager hinges on thinking sex as an ontological
question, which requires a primary negativity in order to be thought. This primary
negativity is lost in translation from “sex” to “gender” because it assumes that a passage
from one gender to two, or, a multiplicity is philosophically possible, or even
emancipatory, such that “gender trouble” is reduced or dissolved when multiplicities are
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be enacted, and thus these symbolic entities become less troubling philosophically. Yet,
Zupančič is correct to assert that, when one “removes sex from sex” as a way of
neutralizing ontology, the problem of sex persists out of sight. Zupančič invites us to
“see” the issue in a different light, not in the sense of phenomenality (that one can see
difference), but in a philosophical sense: through a dark light.
Mind the Gap: Sex and Sexuality
In Encore Lacan writes: “Discourse begins from the fact that there is a gap here […] but,
after all, nothing prevents us from saying that it is because discourse begins that the gap
is produced. It is a matter of complete indifference toward the result. What is certain is
that discourse is implied in the gap,” (Lacan, 16). It could be argued that the particular
ontological status of sex and of sexuality thought together with question of sexual
difference, originated in Freudian thought. Freud enables us to answer the question: what
is the causal relationship between sexuality and sexual difference? Freud tells us that the
sexual drive is, in the first instance, independent of any object. From this, one can
conclude that sexual attraction (toward a particular object) is not (self) evidenced by the
existence of a sexual drive. Freud’s controversial discoveries are far too numerous to list
here. For our purposes, we will discuss the discovery of the autoerotic (polymorphous)
infantile sexuality, and the de-naturalization of sexuality (breaching with the reproductive
imperative), with a further push toward the de-sexualization of the libido, in the precise
sense that Freud asserts that the libido is always (already) “masculine,” that will be
discussed in order to try to make sense of the “causal” relationship between sex,
sexuality, and sexual difference. This is indeed a very modern discovery and theoretical
advance; it is Cartesian in the sense of a scientific thrust toward de-sexualizing a
universal. The scandal of Freud’s inaugural text Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality
was to posit a sameness within or prior to, sexual difference. He writes, “The auto-erotic
activity of the erogenous zones is, however, the same in both sexes, and owing to this
uniformity there is no possibility of a distinction between the sexes such as arises after
puberty” (Freud, 141). Though, Freud goes on to inscribe libido as properly “masculine”
or, as he says, “of a masculine nature,” one can see that, again, what is common to the
sexes is what is problematic; it is not that libido “occurs” in men and not women, but
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rather, that libido is operatively masculine and does not have a particular object in mind.
This discovery, not only involves sameness, but an upending of the teleology of sexuality
as such. Freud introduces the notion of infantile sexuality that essentially thwarts the
singularity of heterosexuality by introducing a distinction between “sexual object”
(“opposite” sex) and “sexual aim” (action impelled by the drive toward an object/end),
thus making space for deviations from the scientific discourse. The audacity of Freud,
which he makes clear in the rhetorical strategy of the opening pages, was to launch a
theory of sexuality that breaks with the analogy of what is “natural” or purely corporeal.
The analogy between sexuality and hunger no longer holds under this view, and Lacan
will later remark that an animal repeatedly satisfies itself because it does not know the
pleasure of hunger. The textual evidence in favour of Freud’s distancing is further
propped up by the fact that the medical discourse was clearly driven to subordinate
“sexuality” to genital reproduction. However, Freud’s predecessors were not blind to the
symbolic function of sexuality and the discursive and polemical context that surrounds
his work was no doubt influential. It was Freud, however, who radicalized the
“anthropological” or cultural significance of sexuality. In Three Essays, one finds a
distinction between terms which were previously collapsed or employed interchangeably,
most notably in regard to “Geschlechtstrieb” and “Sexualtrieb,” the genital and sexual
drives. This distinction makes possible a discussion of the “indifference” of the “Freudian
Thing” as Lacan calls it. Freud’s notion of the “Thing,” the “sexual thing” articulates a
polymorphous autoerotic sexuality, which is emphatically, and “enigmatically”
indifferent toward any sexual object. Indeed, this cluster of terms and their relation to one
another sounds “pre-sexual” if one considers how the sexual drive, genital drive, and
reproductive drive were coextensively linked (and indiscriminate) before the Freudian
incursion. It is at this juncture that “sexuality” is plagued by what it is not (supposed to
be), namely, the Freudian thing.
To connect the Freudian insight with the philosophical imperative of this inquiry, the
term “missing,” discursively speaking, refers to the botched attempt to identify sex or
sexuality in the Platonic key (as an Idea). Therefore, the courtship of “ontology” incited
by Zupančič, can be understood as a philosophical rescue mission: to find, or name, what
is missing in the discourse on sex. To drive Freud’s point in a somewhat oblique way,
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Zupančič insists that, what structures civilization (and its discontents), what provides the
motivating force behind it, is not that which is, but that which is not. To this end,
sexuality (if it is thought relationally) is not a philosophical problem because it exists but,
rather, it is plagued by what does not exist, hence the non-relation of the sexual relation.
When Lacan says: “Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel” he is speaking of a structural
impossibility pertaining to the problem of the signifying logic. This is a key example of a
statement (énconé) which radically shifts the position of the “subject of enunciation,
meaning the point of view of the speaking subject” (énconication). The formulas of
sexuation must be understood as a subjective response to the structural impossibility of
the sexual relation. In a paradoxical sense, contradiction is precisely why Lacan writes
(formulates). Within the seminar…Ou Pire he introduces the formulas of sexuation as an
attempt to: “to fix that which makes up for the impossibility to write the sexual relation”
(Lacan, 31).
It is from the standpoint of sexuality as a structural impossibility (hence, the non-relation)
that Zupančič points out how we can understand Freud as clearly demonstrating how the
sexual (split) is a priori, and thus precedes sexual division (difference). In terms of how
the libido is operative in the symbolic register, we can understand what Freud means by
“masculine” by looking at a passage from Zupančič:
If pure Masculinity and pure Femininity existed (if we were able to say what they
are), they—or, rather, their sexuality—would be one and the same (“masculine”).
But since they do not exist, there is sexual difference” (Zupančič, 45).
This paradoxical formulation tells us that sexual difference does not arrive from there
being two sexes or sexualities, but rather emerges as a “missing sex” (the “missing”
signifier). This position upends the notion of there being a primary sex (male) which
makes possible, or regulates, a derivative “second sex.”32

“Missing sex,” for Zupančič is a logical statement: “if the “second sex” is missing, this does not imply that we have
only a ‘first sex’ (masculinity), since one sex does not amount to ‘sex’ at all: if there is only one sex, it is not a ‘sex’ in
any meaningful sense.” What is Sex? 46
32
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When we speak of “masculine” and “feminine,” it is oft understood that we are speaking
of “ideals” with no corresponding reality as such. Furthermore, that no singular person is
purely masculine or feminine, but a mélange or variation of both. This view, despite any
attempt to register a sense of individuality or multiplicity, incarnates the whole only to
“deconstruct” it. Now, an even more paradoxical formulation is introduced by Zupančič:
“what splits into two is the very nonexistence of the one (that is, of the one which, if it
existed, would be the Other)” (Zupančič, 46, my emphasis). Zupančič’s enigmatic
formulation enables us to understand the formulas of sexuation: displacing the discourse
of the “second sex,” Simone de Beauvoir’s eponymous 1949 text, and “name” for
woman, the Lacanian lexicon places woman in the category of “Other,” and in particular
the Other in the sexual relationship.
Formulas of sexuation: What we (don’t) talk about when we talk about sex

Figure 1: A simulacrum of what Lacan wrote.33

Lacan presented, as if unveiling a painting, the formulas of sexuation during his 1972-3
seminar Encore. One might wonder, why sexuation and not sexuality? The logic of
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This image has been retrieved from the following public domain website:
https://nosubject.com/Formulas_of_Sexuation
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sexuation is not coterminous with biological sex. Rather, it concerns the subjective
responses to castration. The “feminine” and “masculine,” as per Lacan’s typical use, refer
to subject positions (of enunciation) and their relationship to castration; formulated as a
division, or cut, as one can see in the visual representation. Again, like sexual difference,
for speaking subjects, castration is a universality, and is precisely what each “side”
shares, albeit in quite distinct ways: Castratio ergo sum. I am castrated therefore I am
(split). If one views castration in the sense of “desexualization,” then it is the signifier
that takes precedence over an organic (in the sense of organs) distinction. In the graph,
the left-hand side represents the “masculine” side, and the right, the “feminine.” Without
belabouring a reading of this figure in toto, I will focus on two elements. The
“masculine” subject of castration represents a moment of “exception,” such that there is
the possibility for an ideal man. The “ideal” is not split, as with the “feminine”
subjectivity (one can think of the Mother-Whore split, Jean Eustache’s film La maman et
la putain comes to mind). The second reference point is the Lacanian “pas-tous” (notwhole, or not-all) in relation to phallic jouissance.
The conceptual cluster for “A Love Letter” (Seminar VⅡ) concerns what Lacan terms the
“four discourses,” and the relationship between the formulas of sexuation, in respect to
the “analytic” and “scientific” discourses. As Lacan notes, the “social link” (or tie) is
based on “the inscription of the four discourses.” Lacan demonstrates how social links
come to be through visual representations, and this is how one should understand the
formulas of sexuation, as an attempt to formulate how speaking beings (all of us) who are
enmeshed within the social space are inscribed by discourse. Put very clearly, the
formulas of sexuation demonstrate how sexual difference qua division, is symbolized
(how it is inscribed). Analytic discourse, to which this graph and this text (Encore)
belong, “aims at meaning”; however, it is a meaning that is constituted and oriented by
failure. The formulas of sexuation demonstrate how man and woman (“masculine” and
“feminine”) acquire their inscription, and this inscription is necessarily replete with
tension, the tension that forms the social link. Furthermore, Lacan argues that all
speaking subjects necessarily belong to one side or the other. Within Section XII of
Encore, Lacan provides a close reading of the graph. For our purposes herein, I would
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like to draw out certain emphases and their respective consequences that will drive my
argument.
A key difference between the respective sides is the presence of the “father function” on
the left. Here, “man” does not refer to the universal human, but rather “masculine”
subjectivity or “man.” The existence of the father figure should be understood as a
moment of exception, such that this figure manages to evade the universal imperative of
castration and thus presents a singular case. The graph reads: there is at least one (the
Ideal man) who manages to escape castration. Conversely, on the “feminine” side (“the
woman portion of speaking subjects”), there is no subject (no “x”) who manages to
escape castration. The asymmetry of what drives the operativity of the exception is
grounded in the non-existence of a singular feminine Ideal, such that the feminine ideal is
always already split (hence, the Mother and the Whore; outside of fantasy, it is prohibited
to be “both”). If we move from the formulas of sexuation toward the enigmatic proviso
“il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel,” one must bear in mind what Lacan argues is the purpose
of analytic discourse: “the aim [...] insofar as it pursues what can be said and enunciated”
(Lacan, 82). This argument presents a mise en cause: what does Lacan mean by
“rapport?” Guy Le Gaufey has contributed to the discourse on the “rapport” with his text
Lacan and the Formulae of Sexuation: Exploring Logical Consistency and Clinical
Consequences. Therein, he argues that it is a “stupidity” to translate “rapport” simply as
“relationship,” which signals the negation of the sexual relationship. Bruce Fink, in his
footnotes to Encore, demonstrates the ambiguity of this term. The movement of thought
that culminates in the formulas of sexuation is described by Le Gaufey more or less in the
following way. Lacan puts into words the logical conclusion of the formulae of sexuation
with the provocative affirmation according to which “il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel”:
there is no sexual rapport. Rapport in the sense of relationship: a structural, logical,
mathematical point, not an empirical “sexual” relation; ratio, such that there is an
incommensurability at play, a lack of equal measure.34

This section is indebted to Guy le Gaufey’s pathbreaking text Lacan and the Formulae of Sexuation: Exploring
Logical Consistency and Clinical Consequences (2019).
34
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To drive this point, I will focus on the “feminine” side of the graph. The graph tells us
that all women are subject to castration. This lack of exception is what motors feminine
subjectivity as such, as one can see with the splitting of the feminine ideal. However,
what enables us to understand the incommensurability is the existence of the enigmatic
“pas-tout” (not-all), which could also be translated as “not-whole.” In contrast to the first
statement, that no x on the feminine side escapes castration, the enigmatic “not-all” is
riddled by antagonism and cannot escape it. When Lacan says that: “la femme n’existe
pas,” it is not the noun that is thrown into question, but rather the definite article: the
Woman does not exist. What the “the” suggests is that there is a closed set of women (the
Woman) represented by a singular ideal. If this were the case, feminine subjectivity
would not be split and women would remain a closed set bound by the exceptionality of
the external figure of the ideal (of non-castration); because this is not the case, the
Woman (as exception to castration) does not exist.
To return to the “missing” entity in the discourse on sex, we will now venture to
demonstrate how the “desexualization” of reality links early modern philosophy to
psychoanalysis. In moving from pre-modern science as a “primitive sexual technique,”
sex as constitutive of being qua being necessarily involves the process of subjectivation.
The subject is not a prison-house of discursive limitations, but is, rather, a speaking
subject who belongs to the symbolic order by which we are constituted. This necessarily
implicates ontology. Materialism without a subject cannot escape the symbolic order
wherein it is brutally entangled. If we speak of the “sexual” as the thrum of biological
mechanisms, something becomes lost, something “human,” and, at the same time, “nonhuman”: the missing signifier. Scientific discourse and the positivist account of sexuality
fail to capture the ontological minus and cannot explain the missing signifier: what we
(don’t) talk about when we talk about sex. It must be stressed: we are dealing with
signifiers, not sexual organs.35

As Owen Hewitson reminds us: “the signifier is a sign without any referent. It does not refer to anything, although it
shares with the trace absence as its fundamental feature,” from the digital source:
https://www.lacanonline.com/2010/06/what-does-lacan-say-about-the-signifier. Furthermore, although the descriptions
of the signifier are dispersed, this early description is useful: In Seminar V: The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan
35
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Zupančič offers a fascinating instance of the failure to “represent” sex in painting, the
crisis of representation for (pre)modern painting which struggled to represent “the human
being” in the form of Adam and Eve. Should the human body be represented as such,
meaning with a navel, or without? The representation of Adam and Eve with a navel
would, biologically speaking, signal a body produced through sexual reproduction rather
than divine creation. If one looks at Reuben’s Adam and Eve, it is clear that the artist
portrayed the body as analogous to the human body, with exact anatomical proportions
(navel and all). The existence of the navel necessarily implies a link (umbilically) to
sexual reproduction and a prior being (the mother). This bodily opening implies a
gruesome origin; to borrow from the Enlightenment’s gothic lexicon, the “gruesome”
body stains the “sublime” origin of divine creation, which is “above” nature. The
gruesome body is a troubled locus for philosophy. Recalling Augustinian poetics: inter
faeces et urinam nascimur (we are born between urine and feces). It is no doubt that
sexuality, in Augustine’s view, was tantamount to a punishment or curse.
The early modern physician and theologian Thomas Browne attempted to address the
issue of the protruding navel in Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1646), a text often referred to as
“vulgar errors.” Therein, he discussed the figuring of Adam and Eve “with” navels. As he
argues: “Now the Navel being a part, not precedent, but subsequent unto generation,
nativity or parturition, it cannot be well imagined at the creation or extraordinary
formation of Adam, who immediately issued from the Artifice of God; nor also that of
Eve, who was not solemnly begotten, but suddenly framed, and anomalously proceeded
from Adam.” 36 The representation of Adam and Eve struggles to maintain the appearance
of being both a deviation and exception to the human being, and representative of the first
(human) beings. Browne’s example is one that makes explicit how philosophy (qua
theology or science) tarries with the messy origin of being.

writes: “That there are in the unconscious signifying chains which subsist as such, and which from there structure, act
on the organism, influence what appears from the outside as a symptom, this is the whole basis of analytic experience,”
36

This quote by Browne has been pulled from the following digital source: Source:
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/pseudodoxia/pseudo55.html
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Why not cover this embarrassing “mark” with a fig leaf? This question enables us to ask:
is the cogito a fig leaf?—an attempt to cover up the messy origin of being? This final
section argues that the cogito is the positive (in the double sense of the word) counterpart
to sexual difference; it is the affirmation of “what is shared,” a “disavowal” of the split,
and an attempt to cover up what is “missing.” This effort to breach with the sexual
cosmology of primitive science and ancient philosophy enables Descartes to posit a
universal, de-sexualized account of the human being as res cogitans, with an accidental,
or at least secondary, (sexual) origin. Psychoanalysis emerges from the same
(epistemological) “break” with traditional metaphysics (as cosmology)—or rather, it is
inaugurated by the same gesture, that is, the thrust of the de-sexualization of reality.
However, the navel represents the hole in knowledge, or the gap that separates what we
can know and the corollary gap in knowledge that is coextensive with the gap in being.
This gap is the space of the unconscious.37 How science responds to this gap is what
interests us.
The process of de-sexualization can be understood as “scientific” in a particular sense.
We might understand the cogito and the formulas of sexuation as two different
“attempts” to formalize impossible junctures. Each attempt requires the further labour of
predicates and conceptual elaborations, and is not self-evident. However, Lacan’s critique
regarding the absence of the symbolic within positivist science also holds in regards to
the cogito. Descartes’ mathesis universalis, a universal model of science propped up by
mathematics, is a pursuit shared by other early modern philosophers such as Leibniz.
However, to read these figures speculatively, one needs to inject the symbolic dimension
retroactively into their works. Psychoanalysis can only be a “scientific vocation” if the
symbolic order fits. Science “as a vocation” is preoccupied with truth, and therefore
attempts to ward off metaphysical dogmatism which claims access to the privileged
domain of the noumenal. This breach is what characterizes all post-Cartesian philosophy.

Zupančič draws our attention to Freud’s formulation in the Interpretation of Dreams: der Nabel des Traums, “the
dream’s navel,” which points to the gap in knowledge. As Freud writes of the “dream’s navel” as “the spot where it
reaches down into the unknown.” 671, Freud
37
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However, the scientific pose of Descartes leaves room for the sublime “big Other”—that
is, God—while remaining dogmatically rationalist, such that God’s truth is always the
truth as such. Discussing very briefly the psychoanalytic concept of truth will enable a
discussion of the link between the cogito, Christianity, and the prohibition of the
unconscious, all of which have a direct effect upon knowledge as truth.
Wittgenstein’s final aphorism in the Tractatus states: “Whereof one cannot speak,
therefore, one must be silent.” However one might interpret this aphorism,
psychoanalysis rejects tout court any prohibitions on impossibility, and this necessarily
involves the (im)possibility of what can be said (or written). To interpret this aphorism as
a positivist (who rejects logical impossibility) or an existentialist (dwelling in the mystery
of being; “that the world is”) would be to miss the mark of the Real. The Real is not a
logical prohibition, but rather a proximity, or “stumbling block,” that prevents us from
having knowledge about it in a strict sense. Alain Badiou considers the Lacanian
prohibition that “we cannot speak about the real” as recourse to sophistry, though
Zupančič is convincing in her rerouting of this critique.38 Her argument is the following:
It is not the case that Lacan prohibits the impossible (speaking about the Real), but rather,
it is precisely at the juncture of impossibility, that one can formalize it, which means
write it. One can see very clearly how Lacan departs from the “anti-philosophy” of
Wittgenstein or the sophists, which by consequence brings him closer to Hegel, and
therefore a dialectical thought which seeks to think through moments of foreclosure and
profound contradiction. As Zupančič writes: “The Real is not some realm or substance to
be talked about, it is the inherent contradiction of speech, twisting its tongue, so to speak.
And this is precisely why there is truth, and why, at the same time, it is not possible to
say it all” (Zupančič, 42). To this end, one could say that philosophy via psychoanalysis,
speaks truth, but with a forked tongue. The concept of “truth” that one finds in Lacan is
not straightforward, but it remains a central motif through his oeuvre. Truth cannot be
revealed all at once, or in full, only in partialities, through paradoxes and slips, the most
enigmatic concept being the already discussed feminine “pas-tous.” If formalization

Zupančič (2017) outlines the debate between Cassin and Badiou, whereby Cassin defends the figure of the Sophist,
and Badiou the Philosopher.
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happens at this limit (the prohibition against the impossible) or impasse of the discursive
space, then philosophical propositions or formalizations can be understood as “universal”
attempts to cover up the dark spot of the Real. “Cogito, ergo sum,” “je pense, donc je
suis,” “ergo sum, ergo existo”—these formulations emerge as “positive” counterparts, as
attempts to formalize what is impossible. The subject of enunciation and the statement
remain split, however.
When we say “I,” the I becomes a placeholder for the signifier; this is not to say that it is
correctly indexed in acts of speech; what belongs to the “index” does not signify, despite
granting the illusion of unity. In light of this split, we may say that logic begins “in” or
with paradox, as Lacan reminds us in L’Étourdit. The relation between logic (as
formulation) and speech is necessarily dialectical for Lacan; the negativity that plagues
the verbal is inextricable from it, it produces it. To speak is to verbalize “knots,” to
necessarily fork your tongue: “I do not use knots because they are non-verbal. On the
contrary, I try to verbalize them” (Lacan, 35). In the final analysis, analytic discourse is
not about accepting contradiction as such, but rather, as Zupančič puts it, “taking one’s
place in it” (Zupančič, 71). Under this view is not a shift in truth as such, but in our
position, in the position of the subject of enunciation. In the final analysis, what Zupančič
says of the Lacanian Real, that it “bind[s]the realism of consequences to the modality of
the impossible,” is of consequence for philosophy as such (Zupančič, 81). And thus, the
possibility of “Deus quidam deceptor” (a God who deceives)—a frightening thought.
The problem of metaphysics is shared by (early) modern philosophy and psychoanalysis.
To take hold of sexual difference as a philosophical problem entails a rupture with
traditional ontologies. The sexual cosmology or cosmogony of pre-modern philosophy
was structured around sexual difference; pre-modern philosophy and its attendance
practices (mathematics, logic) demonstrate how active/passive, light/dark, form/matter,
are linked to sexual difference as such. On the side of each split, the “masculine” side is
predicated on activity, light (of reason), and form, whereas the “feminine” side is
predicated on passivity, darkness, and matter. One finds everywhere from Pythagoras to
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Scholastic thought a “table of categories”39 that is explicitly marked by sexual difference.
These “essences” were thought to ground the very nature of being and thus can only be
understood as structuring reality as such. However, taking distance from traditional
cosmology does not obviate the question of sex as ontological. Rather, it is only by way
of a de-sexualization that sex can be understood in a properly ontological, modern sense.
To return to the crisis of the representation constituted by the navel and the gap which it
attempts to cover (the ontological minus), the more timid artists employed fig leaves and
other foliage to cover up the traumatic hole of the navel. The fig leaf covers up not only
“what is there,” (the gruesome and irrational body) but also what is not there, namely the
lack.
In this final section, I will argue that the cogito can be conceived as a positive veil that
attempts to cover up the inherent antagonism that is proper to the human being.
Furthermore, this attempt to cover up the messy origin does not necessarily mean that the
cogito succeeds. In turning to the cogito, I analyze the cogito as carrying with it a set of
beliefs, insofar as “masculinity” is predicated on the pretense or belief in a self-identical
existence. Is the cogito a “closed set,” in the sense that the “masculine” side of the
formulas of sexuation closes the set of “all men?” Paradoxically, for Descartes, the
“exception” to the messiness of castration (which implies non-identity) is afforded to all
thinking beings. It attempts to de-sexualize the messiness of human beings by positing a
neutral, and thus neutered, thinking subject. The unexceptional exceptionality of the
thinking subject is also found in Kant’s propulsive imperative within “What is
Enlightenment?” (1784): “sapere aude,” to find courage to use one’s reason; that which
is already available to us as thinking subjects. This thesis will now make a case for the
“masculine” and “feminine” cogito, a contradictio in adjecto if we consider the asexual
cogito. However, sex in the ontological sense opens the space for thinking the cogito as a
gesture that is proper to speaking subjects, and these subjects are necessarily split and

Anne Carson,in “The Gender of Sound,” draws our attention to the Pythagorean table of opposites, which links
femininity (“female”) with darkness, passivity, limitation. Similarly, Alenka Zupančič, “Sexual Difference and
Ontology,” makes the argument that “new ontologies,” fail to consider sexual difference in light of the Lacanian
concept of the “Real,” or sexual difference as an ontological problem.
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“placed” in the symbolic order. While the splitting of the cogito does not necessarily
exculpate Descartes (from the accusation of “dualism”), it enables us to answer the
question: does the cogito have (a) sex? (in an oblique way).40
Castratio ergo sum: the “masculine” and “feminine” cogito
The formulas of sexuation demonstrate how the “masculine” and “feminine” modalities
negotiate their respective positions in relation to castration. The term “position” cannot
be underestimated here, as the subject’s relation to castration is the universal
subjectivizing force which determines the position of the “subject of the enunciation,” as
discussed in the previous chapter.41 It is from this standpoint (of the subject of
enunciation) that we should effort to understand where to situate the cogito. Is the cogito
a pretense or belief, masquerade or imposture (the feminine and masculine subject
positions par excellence)? At this juncture, it should be clear what, along Lacanian lines,
is meant by “masculine” and “feminine”; they are subjective responses to the
“ontological minus.” Lacan’s concept of difference makes clear his explicit break with
structural linguistics. Such that, when we speak of sexual division, it is not that we ought
to look for a differentiating feature, but a “universal parallax inscription.” If we think of
subjectivity as a geometry, it concerns “points” of view, and these points determine the
subject (position) of enunciation. When Lacan says “I am not where I think,” this
intervention holds that there is a cut within the discursive space that literally splits the
subject, or, for our purposes, the cogito.
In terms of understanding Lacan’s interpretation of Descartes, Žižek writes in “Cogito
and Sexual Difference” that we must read the cogito through Kant (and his critique of
it).42 He argues that two “opposed” readings of the cogito can be found in Lacan’s
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The problematic of Cartesian dualism is not the focus of my inquiry herein. In terms of the Cartesian body, and the
relationship between body and soul, my reading of Descartes is heavily indebted to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s The
Phenomenology of Perception and Jean-Luc Marion’s On Passive Thought: The Myth of Cartesian Dualism. It is this
reading that subtends my understanding of the Cartesian (myth) of dualism. To read Marion with Lacan would be a
fascinating endeavour, but alas, this is not what I try to do here.
41

Chapter One presents an in-depth analysis of the significance of the subject of enunciation in (on the Cartesian
“subject”)
42 This section is absolutely indebted to Žižek!
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seminars, which, despite their divergence, can, and ought to be, read “synchronously.”
This approach is interesting, as it invites us to dwell with Lacan’s formulation “I am not
where I think.” Such that, the “I think,” and thought are non-identical. The analysis
herein will attempt to address Lacan’s double interpretation of the cogito, and Žižek’s
analysis thereof. The two “opposed” Lacanian readings can be found in The Four
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis and the Logic of Phantasy. Lacan “breaks up
the unit” of cogito ergo sum in order to grasp the respective parts and put (force) them
into new relations. Žižek reads Lacan as figuring the cogito and its respective postures or
choices as (being) coextensive with sexual difference (division). The “two” cogitos are
presented in the following way: cogito as a “forced choice” (which entails a loss of
being), and cogito as a “choice” that relegates thought to the unconscious. Otherwise put,
thought without being and being without thought. Žižek further qualifies these positions
in terms of a Kantian “I think”—an apperception founded on the inaccessibility of the I’s
being (the res cogitans)—and the Cartesian “affirmation” that is founded on the
exclusion of thought. These positions represent the feminine and masculine cogitos
respectively Žižek’s speculative advance is to suggest that we read these opposing
interpretations concomitantly “as a duality that registers sexual difference” (Žižek, 10).
For “each” cogito asks (begs) the question: “what am I?” albeit in a different register.
The masculine cogito is a “forced choice” that engenders a loss of being. Otherwise put,
in choosing being, the masculine cogito has being that is leached of real being. This
enables him to qualify Meillassoux’s conception of the subject as the “masculine” cogito,
such that the Meillassouxian subject presumes it exists (as a homogeneous subject) at the
expense of thinking the Real. As Lacan puts it: “ergo sum” I think, “therefore I am.”43
With this statement, Lacan ascribes “fantasy-being” to the masculine cogito. Fantasybeing presumes the possibility of reconciliation, such that the decentered thought that
“correlates” to the subject’s being can be mended through self-conscious reflection. This
position holds that conscious thought is correlative to the subject’s being. To put this
more clearly, the masculine cogito requires that self-consciousness necessarily leads to
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Lacan, Logic of Phantasy, 66.
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self-transparency. One could say that the Descartes of analytic philosophy embodies the
masculine cogito, the self-transparent subject, which makes a parody out of Cartesian
philosophy.44 The masculine cogito attempts to re-direct castration away from being.
Under this view, the masculine cogito diverts thought away from castration, thus masking
the dubiousness of “all x” which marks the existential “Man” as really existing.
By contrast, the feminine cogito “chooses thought,” the pure “I think,” which can be
understood in relation to Derrida’s argument concerning hyperbolic doubt—that the
cogito (must) pass through a point of madness—which hinges on the pre-existence of a
void, the “pure void,” that colours the opaque space between thought and being, though it
belongs to neither.45 What Derrida refers to as a “pure void of the I think” is radicalized
through Lacan’s conception of feminine jouissance as the non-existent point.46 It is not
the case that feminine subjectivity has an obliquely fulfilling access to jouissance that
male subjectivity does not. Rather, the paradox of feminine jouissance suggests that the
feminine cogito as the “pure I think” is only possible if the subject passes through the
sheen of jouissance and of senselessness. The feminine cogito is coterminous with “pure
impossible thought” and must be understood in terms of the subject of enunciation (that is
decidedly feminine qua subject position). From the standpoint of the opposed figures of
the cogito, one gleans Lacan’s critique of self-transparency, such that self-consciousness
requires an external object. If the cogito is an enunciation that “belongs” to the ego, the
fig leaf that conceals the loss of the masculine cogito’s being can thus be understood as
the “guise of existence”—the masquerade of being that confuses the masquerade with
real being.
By contrast, the feminine cogito is a portal to the Lacanian Real. This position
demonstrates how it is precisely through non-recognition of the res cogitans, such that

This “parody” happens at “both ends” so to speak. The “specter” of the Cartesian cogito can be found across Western
Academia, as Žižek argues in The Ticklish Subject.
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See Derrida Cogito and the History of Madness.
See Lacan Seminar XX; Ecrits. As Lacan reminds us endlessly— The relation of the subject to the phallus is “[…]
established without regard to the anatomical difference between the sexes” (Écrits 282). Thus, the relation does not
exist because anatomical difference is there, but rather, it is grounded in what is not there... and this “not there”
happens to be shared by men/women. A discussion of the “rapport” is masterfully rendered in Guy Le Gaufey’s Lacan
and the Formulae of Sexuation: Exploring Logical Consistency and Clinical Consequences.
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the subject cannot “find” herself (her being) in thought. This moment of non-recognition
demonstrates how reality, perceived from the perspective of the male cogito, requires a
non-visible stain (the illusion of a Whole). By contrast, the feminine cogito is oriented
toward a making-visible of this stain, which necessarily requires an Other (who says for
me “I am where I think”). This shift in gaze, or point of view, is constitutive of the
feminine position, whereby recourse to the Other grounds the way toward selfconsciousness. The feminine position reveals that self-consciousness as such is always
already decentered. Self-consciousness “comes into being” from the “outside,” an
external “place,” that is the place of the Other. As Žižek puts it: “I am aware of myself
only insofar as there is, outside of me, a place in which the truth about me is articulated”
(Žižek, 13). This articulated truth comes from an Other. From this description, one can
see how these two “places” are unable to coincide, such that one cannot abolish the stain,
but can only “look” toward the other for the articulation (the making visible) of this stain.
A contrario the fantasy of the male cogito, the perspective of the feminine cogito does not
seek to reconcile the gap between self-consciousness and self-transparency, but rather
brings us closer to the Other: the space of impenetrable opacity that is constitutive of
symbolic reality as such.
If we begin with the premise that we cannot abolish the stain (the gap), we may find a
way to negotiate the cogito as symptom or sinthome; the latter being the correlative stain
that marks the non-being of the subject. There are fundamental asymmetries that must be
addressed in order to proceed. First, the cogito must acknowledge the existence of an
Outside that is irreducible to intersubjectivity—the lack of resolution concerning lack
itself—such that we must understand this externality as constitutive of the symbolic, the
structuring principle of reality. Otherwise put, there is a modality of exclusion at play that
is constitutive; one is barred from the access point of self-consciousness without recourse
to the other. This is a Hegelian move in the precise sense that mediation is necessarily
linked to subjectivity (the doubling of self-consciousness). As Žižek puts it, “[the] object
is stricto sensu the correlate of self-consciousness” (Žižek, 13).
The feminine cogito is a vehicle for understanding the Kantian “gaze,” which introduces
to subjectivity a subject bereft of pure reason, which is the empty form of “self-
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apperception.” If one follows Kant through Lacan here, the empty form of selfapperception requires an Other. The belief that one can—as res cogitans—participate in
some common substance, in the mode of non-symbolic identity, is the pose of the
masculine cogito. The masculine cogito is, in the final analysis, self-consciousness
without a symbolic identity. The “symptom” of this choice is that the subject loses his
entire symbolic identity. As a being leached of real being it has no particularity. In this
respect, the masculine cogito can only “be” through (symbolic) absence, by trading one’s
being for symbolic compensation. This absence ensures the possibility that the traumatic
incursion of the real is inhibited; thus, the loss of being is linked to masculine prohibition.
I think we can locate the Cartesian exclusion of sex through the masculine cogito, insofar
as, in order to philosophically advance the project of “equality” (a Christian doctrine that
pertains to souls), one must abolish the symbolic identity that is produced through sexual
difference. Thus, we may conjecture that the attachment to the symbolic Whole must be
thought as symptomatic of the masculine cogito.
The correspondence between Descartes and Elisabeth of Bohemia may assist us in
understanding the interplay of masculine/feminine subject positions. The case of
Elisabeth, or the challenge of a (woman’s) migraine, can be drawn from the involved
correspondence between her and Descartes, and will serve to illuminate this point.47
Therein, Elisabeth indicts Descartes’ insistence on substance dualism. I will briefly gloss
her argument, in order to reveal how the “portion of women speakers,” as Lacan puts it,
serves to challenge the belief that self-mastery can eclipse doubt. One could say that
Elisabeth’s question assumes the form: “What am I, if not a throbbing substance?” How
can the pure res cogitans become subordinate to madness, migraine, or illness, such that
it becomes disoriented? For our purposes, we will focus on how she frames her question.
If the feminine cogito is closer to Kantian apperception (the void of the “pure I think”),
then Elisabeth’s attempt to bring negative qualities into philosophy can be read as an
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subject who appropriates the desire of the Other. In this case, she appropriates Descartes’ “search for truth,” and other
vocational aims that he enunciates in epistolary exchanges.
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attempt to reveal the gap in the function of “cause.” This gap affords a symptomatic
experience of language, of rifts and lost “causes.”
What Elisabeth is saying, is that Descartes, when speaking as a substance dualist, cannot
account for phenomena such as headaches or bodily disruptions that would render the
cogito confused and unable to think clearly. She writes to him during 1645, experiencing
a “persistent illness,” in this exchange Descartes prescribed a Stoic remedy that seems to
undermine his own explanations of a materialist account of the passions (in the Passions
of the Soul). In suggesting that her fever was caused by sadness, his remedy is reflection;
she must reflect on her soul, which will ultimately clarify for her why she was in pain,
and thus, can overcome it. Descartes asserts that Elisabeth must “make reason her
Master,” and so, would the corollary to this argument be—in the Baconian key—to make
nature her slave, meaning her own nature? I argue that, despite his original prescription
(which was rejected), this intervention forced Descartes to think about the irreducibility
of phenomena to pure thought or corporeal experience, which forces him to invent a
“third primitive notion.” 48
However, the ambiguity of the feminine cogito qua desiring is eclipsed by the emergence
of early modern empirical science. The possibility of a model of sexual difference qua
subjectivity is replaced by a cerebral model (the positivist cogito avant la lettre) that
pricks feminine subjectivity for not being empirical enough. The medical translation of
the feminine modality of questioning demonstrates natural philosophy’s move toward
empiricism, leaving behind a metaphysics that could, in principle, tarry with “third”
notions, such as traumatic incursions that shift the subject’s position of enunciation. This
is precisely the de-sexualization (in the sense of cosmology) that links (early) modern
science and psychoanalysis, albeit paradoxically, as it purports to posit a doctrine of
(spiritual or mental) equality, while clinging to (meta)physicalist accounts of inferiority.
Medical or empirical science misses the mark, yet the ambiguity of the “third” space that
Descartes attempts to articulate remains. This impasse affords us the possibility to think
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The third primitive notion, rather than being a third created substance presents a novel way of understanding the ego,
as a thing that cannot think without a body, meaning that union—the union of men sand meum corpus—indicates a
primordial mode of existing for the ego, that is characterized by passive thought.
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through Descartes avec Lacan, with their shared aporetic qualities and commitment to
knowledge as truth. The following section will explore the possibilities of this speculative
partnership.
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Chapter 3

3

The Cogito in Love

“Love is infinite potentially—not in actuality—for it is impossible to love with an
end in sight. In other words, the desires of people in love are infinite, and they can never
settle down after achieving something. This is because after obtaining it, they long for
something else, and something else again, and something more after that.”
Tullia d’Aragona, Dialogues on the Infinity
of Love

“Say I may wait for you […] I waited a long time—Master—but I can wait
more—wait till my hazel hair is dappled […] I want to see you more —Sir—than all I
wish for in this world … Could you come to new England this summer […] Would you
like to come—Master?”
Emily Dickinson, Master Letters
A Very Obscure Definition
Depending on whom you ask, the philosophical passion par excellence is love. Wonder is
a prime contender. The philosophical concept of love bears on psychoanalysis, which has
developed its own novel conceptualization. This chapter will not belabour a philosophical
genealogy of love with footnotes to Plato, but rather, we will discuss the Cartesian
concept of love and its modern incarnations, which will include the arguments of postCartesian philosophers such as François Poullain de la Barre and Mary Wollstonecraft.49
The definition of love that we will explore herein is given by Descartes in The Passions
of the Soul (1649). The argument of this chapter rests on linking Descartes’ conception of
love to the modern subject of psychoanalysis, such that the experience of love makes
explicit the previous chapter’s thesis: that the cogito is split, and this split can be further
qualified as divided through sexual difference. Furthermore, the analysis the Cartesian

Badiou writes in In Praise of Love: “As you can see, philosophy struggles with huge tension. On the one hand,
love seen as a natural extravagance of sex arounses a kind of rational suspicion. Conversely, we see an apology for love
that borders on religious epiphany. Christianity hovers in the background, a religion of love after all. And the tension is
almost unbearable,” 15.
49As
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concept of love demonstrates a shift that is inaugurated by modern subjectivity, namely,
the emphases placed on (self)esteem and recognition. To begin, it seems necessary to
gloss the definition put forth by Descartes in Passions: “Love is an excitation of the soul,
caused by the motion of the spirits, which incites it to join itself in volition to the objects
that appear to be suitable to it” (Passions, §49). To understand why Descartes arrives at
this definition, some provisional notes are required. Following the Cartesian advance on
love, we will venture into the works of the Cartesian and post-Cartesian Enlightenment
thinkers, which will then enable us to arrive at Lacan, and to test the thesis of the Second
Chapter: that it is possible to conceive of a masculine and feminine cogito, and how love
makes explicit this split.
The Passions of the Soul (1649) is borne out of correspondence, and in particular, the
questioning of Elisabeth of Bohemia, who provokes Descartes to think through the
philosophical—in the sense of moral—phenomenon of the passions. This was difficult to
flesh out for the geometer, but Descartes holds that he writes and speaks “en physicien”
(as a physicist) and not “en philosophe morale” (as a moral philosopher).50 Drawing from
his previous philosophy, the passions require the union of body and soul and thus,
Descartes considers the consequences of this union in a novel way. The text brings to the
fore a fundamental point: the case of the passions reveals that the mind is not always
principally active, that there is a degree of submission involved. However, to arrive at
what we might call the “subjective,” or the subjectivizing aspects of the text, which
explicitly pertains to the experience and function of love, we will attempt to understand
why Descartes begins as (though does not remain) a physicist. The structure of the text
builds upon Descartes’ previous metaphysical thinking: it begins with the essential truths
of God and the nature of the soul that was previously established in the Meditations,
before turning to a physicalist account of the passions, such that he gives physiological
descriptions to account for the passions. In this text he speaks qua “natural philosopher,”
yet there is something peculiar about the metaphysical enterprise. For the purpose of this
chapter, we will focus on the concept of love for finite speaking subjects.
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This enunciation is observed by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Passions, xvi.
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While Descartes’ conception of love attempts to extend his previous metaphysical
thinking, the Passions is unique in its approach. Previously, Descartes attempted to
explain truth in relation to the Whole. By contrast, his account of love in Passions is
bound to the ego and tends toward what is “practical,” a more subjective account of
ethical consideration. In this text, the passions, and love in particular, are considered in a
different register in Passions, predicated on the notion of consideration and (self)esteem.
What is it about love that makes the subject “think small”? It seems that, if one begins
with the I, which is (supposedly) coextensive with the greater Whole, it drives the subject
away from the universal. In a letter to Elisabeth, Descartes writes: “one must […] think
that one […] is, in effect, one part of the universe and, more particularly even, one part of
this earth, one part of this state, and this society and this family” (VⅢ:291-3). There is,
accordingly, a contradictory demand on the subject: to see the goodness of the universe
as Whole, rather than in any particular subject. The subject is small, thinks small, and in
the final analysis, is imperfect. It is only by thinking the Whole that the subject can
understand goodness. How does love “fit” within this scheme? There seems to be a
strong element of self-effacement, or abandonment at play. Again, as Descartes writes to
Elisabeth concerning what man ought to do: “abandoning himself altogether to God’s
will, he strips himself of his own interests and has no other passion than to do what he
thinks pleasing to God” (Frigo, 1103). If love is grounded in metaphysics and is anchored
in God’s perfection, as Descartes argues to Elisabeth in another letter, what takes place
when the subject turns his affection toward the utterly imperfect human love object? In
an early letter to Elizabeth, Descartes suggests that God’s perfection is sufficient to
justify such love: “Since the true object of love is perfection, when we elevate our minds
to considering God as He is, we will find ourselves naturally … inclined to love him”
(VⅢ:291-2). As botched imperfections, our love belongs not only to God, but to other
subjects that draw us in. However, the question remains: must the subject qua love object
be thought in relation to the Whole to justify loving them at all?
How can we move from a love of God to the love of his imperfect creations? It seems
unlikely that Descartes will manage to defend the love for others with his metaphysical
defense of reality. The Passions attempts to defend the love of others based on the
structure of the passions and the good they provide. Again, in a letter to Elisabeth, he
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attempts to link the love of others to some greater Whole: If we think only of ourselves
alone, we can enjoy only those goods that are particular to us. On the other hand, if we
consider ourselves as part of some other body, we may participate in the goods held in
common, without being deprived of those that are proper to ourselves. Furthermore,
Descartes argues that the subject should consider the joy she is experiencing as connected
to the greater Whole, in order to augment the sensation of joy. However, Descartes does
not provide a demonstration of the subject’s connection to the greater Whole. It must be
noted that these are practical, not metaphysical arguments. Thus, the cogito in love must
maintain that he is both a distinct substance (res cogitans) and always already a “part” of
the Whole, despite the absent demonstration of this. We may say that the subject’s place
in the world is a presupposition.51
In the Ethics, Spinoza gripes that Descartes’ definition of love was very “obscure.”52
Spinoza takes issue with the notion that Descartes would ground love in a “wish, a
“volition” that excites the soul. As Alberto Frigo notes, there are two rather peculiar
aspects that subtend this “quite baroque” definition. First, that the lover thinks of himself
as joined to the lover “from the present,” and second, that Descartes posits an “imaginary
whole encompassing the lover and the beloved as an essential component of this
passion.” Regarding the temporal dimension of the argument, Frigo reminds us of
Descartes’ distinction between desire, which is oriented toward a future, and love, which
is anchored to the present: “The temporal divide between love and desire is confirmed by
the enumeration (dénombrement) and the “orderly list” of passions at the beginning of the
second part of the treatise” (Frigo, 1101). Yet, what makes love the passion of the
present? While Frigo notes how the orderly consideration of the passions is not better
understood by recourse to the temporal distinction, one must better grasp the context in

In a letter to Chanut (around 1645), Descartes writes: “It is the the nature of love [l’amour] to make one consider
oneself and the object loved as a single whole of which one is but a part; and to transfer the care one previously took of
oneself to the preservation of the whole.” (IV:611; cf. IV:308; IX:387)
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Spinoza’s critique of Descartes’ definition of love in the Ethics: “The definition given by writers who define love as
‘the lover’s wish to be united with the object of his love’ expresses not the essence of love, but a property of it; and
these writers have not sufficiently grasped the essence of love, neither they have succeeded in forming any clear
conception of its property. This has led to the universal verdict that their definition is very obscure” 313, Spinoza:
Complete Works (emphasis mine).
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which Descartes was enmeshed. There is a thickness, which Descartes seeks to
underplay, that permeates the notion of presence that is borne out of the Thomistic
account of temporality. Aquinas defines love as “the relation or co-adaptation (habitudo
vel coaptatio) of the appetite in respect to the object which the desiring creature covets”
(Frigo, 1101). When looking at the love object, one can infer that it is (at present) united
to the subject, by affinity or relation of some sort. Aquinas' argument is predicated on the
distinction between pleasure and longing which corresponds to presence and absence,
respectively. The notion of habitudo or proportio suggests that not only do we inhabit the
goodness of the relation, but the passion and its effect (goodness) is commensurable
(proportio). This perspective suggests that “real presence” is the cause of “joyful
passions.” Frigo’s analogy is useful here, not only because it reveals how philosophers
“in their time” are scarred by a previous Master, it further demonstrates how Descartes’
conception of love is marked by the perfume of Christianity.
Love, for Descartes, seems to suggest the unity of the subject with his beloved, but this is
not necessarily the case. The notion of unity that Descartes is working with is worth
bringing to bear. Oddly, this union does not necessarily imply physical togetherness.
There is, in the Thomistic account of presence and union, two conceptions: real union
(which is physical) and emotional union (which is abstract). As Aquinas writes in the
Summa Theologiae:
The first of these unions is caused ‘effectively’ by love, because love moves man
to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and
belonging to him, the second union is caused ‘formally’ by love, because love
itself is this union or bond.53
Frigo’s engagement with Aquinas reveals that the presence of love is actually
independent of the presence or absence of the lover, it persists et in absentia et in
praesentia. Thus, it is indifferent to the “flesh and blood” presence of the subject. This

Quoted in Alberto Frigo’s text: “A Very Obscure Definition.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24
(6):1097-1116 (2016), 1101.
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generalization stitches up what otherwise bores a hole in the concept of love, such that
the place of longing and desire (the absentia) no longer provides a gap. Following
Aquinas, who posits equivalence between praesentia and absentia, will help us
understand Descartes’ argument. This “stitching up” of what bores a hole in the presence
of an absence can be understood in relation to Descartes’ sensus communis (as discussed
in Chapter Two) and his belief in the Whole. By this, I mean to say that Descartes’
modern philosophy is characterized by an optimistic Christian worldview, which
subordinates desire to love and situates each subject as part of a Whole, despite a lack of
demonstration of the existence of said Whole: It is presumed qua “cosmic unity.”54
This brings us to Lacanian wager of whether one can say anything sensible about love.
Descartes becomes less philosophical in the precise sense that he posits practical
arguments which are subtended by Thomistic theology. While the language of “appetite”
is not present in Descartes (as that which strives to give matter form) it is replaced by the
metaphysically neutered notion of “consideration.” Subjective consideration (that is, how
to measure esteem) and the “formal unity” of the subject and love object, becomes
indispensable for Descartes. This unity is predicated on the existence of a Whole to
which the subject as lover and his beloved object belong. As previously mentioned, this
Whole is never demonstrated and thus we can see the workings of the imaginary at play.
Descartes attempts to challenge Lacan’s proclamation that nothing sensible can be said
about love, by positing an overly abstract treatment of love. By consideration, Descartes
argues that to love a person or a thing means holding them or something in the space, or
presence, of love according to an affection that exists independently of whether the love
object is present or absent. This implies that the subject must conceive of the love object
(such as when they are absent) and consider them in relation to the subject himself and
the Whole. Frigo puts it succinctly: “In love, I think of myself only from the perspective
of this conceit that reveals me to myself as already (from the present) united to another,
irrespective of whether he is actually present or not” (Frigo,1103). This conception of
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love rests on a fantasy: that the lover can produce, through “imaginative representation”
an illusion whereby he is already united to the beloved object within the Whole, without
losing his substantive separateness from the beloved, the “unity” is abstract and requires a
formal distance.
In a letter to Pierre Chanut, Descartes writes:
It is the nature of love to make one consider oneself and the loved one as a single
whole of which one is a part; and to transfer the care one previously took of
oneself to the preservation of this whole. One keeps for oneself only a part of
one’s care, a part which is great or little in proportion to whether one thinks
oneself a larger or smaller part of the whole to which one has given one’s
affection. (Descartes to Chanut, 1 February 1647,CSM III, 311, italics mine)
The definition is representative of a calculus of affection, which will eventually mark the
conception of modern love as such. Indeed, under this aegis one can “love too much,” as
the contemporary therapeutic literature tells us. To borrow from Frigo’s lexicon, this
description offers a “vrai usage”: a normative claim which bears on the subject’s
comportment, a Regulae for lovers. Descartes thus introduces a concept of love as selfregulation. This position is radically different from Aquinas, if one considers the
difference between order (the long tradition of the “order of charity”) and degree. Now,
we are speaking about the regulative aspect and how (and how much) one ought to love.
The idea of self-regulation is necessarily linked to the narcissistic ego: as Descartes
writes in §82 of Passions, “Nor is there any need to distinguish as many species of love
as there are different objects which may be loved,” on the contrary, we may distinguish in
terms of “distinctions within love may more reasonably be made in terms of our esteem
for what we love in comparison with ourselves.” Thus, the proportion of our love relies
on the judgment the subject has about himself (self-esteem) and how the love object can
be measured in comparison to the subject. Thus, the cogito in love encounters the
Freudian account of the narcissistic ego. However, it is too early to draw such a
comparison. Descartes’ account of love is modern in the precise sense that the order of
the universe is not central to his argument, it is rather the subjectivity of the ego and how
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the love-object “relates” to it. The notion of the Whole to which the subject belongs is
refracted subjectively insofar asit relies on subjective consideration.
This is a modern argument, in that Descartes decisively breaks with the Medieval
hierarchy and the “order of charity” that is predicated on the order of the universe
(cosmos) in order to posit a subjective account of the passions. The notion of self-esteem
usurps the hierarchy of order to postulate that the subject as res cogitans is equally
capable of esteeming for himself what is good.55 Thus, Descartes “rewrites” the rules
about love. A passage from Frigo may be useful to emphasize this point: “the principles
allow for the distinction of different sorts of love is not the nature of things, but the
esteem of the lover: in other words, it is not a matter of how to love things which are
above, close to, and below us. Rather, Descartes instructs us regarding how to love things
we esteem less than, equal to, or more than we esteem ourselves.” Frigo is correct to note
how Descartes inaugurates a novel conception of love based on a subjective account of
love between subjects and their (love) objects. Love no longer belongs to the cosmic
order of things, but rather the social order of the symbolic. The novel conception of love
put forth by Descartes is decidedly rational and modern in the sense that self-regulation is
central to his formulation, which ultimately rests on the “true idea” that is described in
the definition of love within the passions. The subject in love is situated in the social
order, and this placement entails a certain responsibility: to esteem correctly and apply
one’s reason appropriately. This relation is not merely solipsistic, however, as the social
order remains centre stage. Descartes’ correspondence reveals how he came to
understand how one ought to consider this relation: in a letter to Elisabeth from 1645 he
writes:
After having thus recalled the goodness of God, the immortality of our souls and
the greatness of the universe, there is also one more truth the knowledge of which
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seems to me to be quite useful. This is that, even though each of us is a person
separate from others, and by consequence, with interests that are in some manner
distinct from those of the rest of the world, one must, all the same, think that one
does not subsist alone and that one is, in effect, one part of the universe and, more
particularly even, one part of this earth, one part of this state, and this society,
and this family, to which one is joined by his home, by his oath, by his birth. It is
always necessary to prefer the interests of the whole of which one is a part, to
those of one’s person in particular.56
The textual evidence makes clear that Descartes’ conception of love requires that the
subject thinks of himself as part of a whole, in relation to others, institutions, systems,
and the universe. There is an order to things and the subject must measure himself and his
beloved accordingly. While the former passage may seem to posit a generality, it requires
the subject’s judgment, as he further qualifies:
It is always necessary to prefer the interests of the whole, of which one is a part,
to those of one’s person in particular, though with measure and discretion. For
one would be wrong to expose oneself to a great evil in order to procure only a
small good for one’s parents or one’s country. If a man is worth more on his own
than all the rest of his city, he would not be right to sacrifice himself to save it.
(AT IV, 293 = Shapiro, 112, italics mine)
In order to subordinate oneself to the state, society, the “cosmos,” and so on, one must
live in a society whereby the societal mores “were not corrupted.”57 The moral
consideration of the subject relies on the stability of the social order; thus, she can decide
how much she ought to consider others, including her beloved. The subject must perform
a delicate calculus, which Descartes found difficult to formulate. He writes to Chanut:
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Descartes to Elisabeth, 15 September 1645, AT IV, 293, Italics mine.

[T]his is not a matter in which it is necessary to be very exact. It suffices to satisfy one’s conscience, and one can in
this manner give a lot to one’s inclination. For God has so established the order of things and conjoined men together in
so tight a society that even if each person related himself wholly to himself, and had no charity for others, he would not
ordinarily fail to work for them in everything that would be in his power, so long as he used prudence, and principally,
if he lived in a time when mores were not corrupted. (Descartes to Elisabeth, 6 October 1645, AT IV, 316–7 quoted in
Shapiro, 121–2)
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“But … when an individual is joined in volition to his prince, or to his country, if his love
is perfect, he should esteem himself as only a tiny part of the whole which he and they
constitute.” (1 February 1647, CSM III 311). The passion of love pertains not only to the
love object, but to society, nation, and the world at large; thus, it would seem narcissistic
to esteem the love object in such a way as to make the lover the subject’s world. This
calculus is based on a deduction of the principal definition of love that Descartes puts
forth in the text, the very “obscure definition,” that irked Spinoza. However, the
definition, in the final analysis, does promote the bolstering of the ego. The narcissism
that is intrinsic to the love relation (if we take Freud or Lacan seriously) does indeed
seem to reify the solipsism of the ego: the lover becomes my world, yet this world is
simply the world of the subject. Before submitting the Cartesian conception of love to
psychoanalysis, we will discuss what makes this conception of love explicitly modern.
From Exalted Soul to Rational Ego
At this juncture, it seems necessary to advance the thesis of the first and second chapters:
that Descartes inaugurates the modern subject, and to elaborate on how this modern
subjectivity is made explicit in the case of love. In her book Why Love Hurts (2012) Eva
Illouz presents a social genealogy of love, which includes pre-modern courtship
practices, while discussing at length the subjective incursion that begins with modernity,
at the precise juncture where Descartes founds the subject of modernity by enunciating
the cogito. Illouz considers the transformation of love as a key instance of modernity’s
inauguration, such that “the formation of a reflexive emotional self” radically upends the
concept of romantic love (Illouz, 12). While historicism is not central to the argument
herein, it is noteworthy that Illouz links the emergence of the modern emotional self with
the Protestant reformation, a transformative event that subtended the life of Descartes and
his peers.58 Illouz’s text highlights the lack of attention paid to “the pleasure the ego takes
in being able to constitute itself as the object of certainty,” and this extends to eroticism.
Furthermore, she notes that there is a jubilatory pulse at play in the positing of doubt
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while simultaneously anticipating certainty. Following Jean-Luc Marion, she argues that
in addition to “epistemic and ontological certainty,” the ego (le moi) requires “erotic
certainty” (Illouz, 110).59 This view holds that what the lover seeks is not (self)certainty,
but something more radical. The lover seeks assurance of her existence, such that the
question of “do I exist,” can only be confirmed by the lover. If we may craft an aphorism
from Marion’s thesis: The other loves me, therefore I am. Perhaps this is too Lacanian for
Marion, but Lacan’s insight, which builds upon his life’s work of rejecting Cartesian
dualism through Descartes (his textual edifice), gestures toward the fact that one does not
“exist” in any certain way without the Other confirming that I exist. This reformulation or
rerouting of Cartesian certainty is specific to the demands of modernity, which bears on
the subject’s “ontological security,” such that the recognition of the other (whom I love)
becomes equivalent to loving them. The possible aporiae of the self now include this
demand. Illouz is able to link her nodes: from Descartes, Goethe, and Nietzsche, to online
dating and self-help manuals. While the latter genres are glutted with pop wisdom and
contrived generalities, there is a kernel of a shared desire that seems to permeate culture,
whether “high” or “low”: the need to be recognized. Illouz’s argument hinges on the
difference between pre-modern (class) recognition and the modern (social) recognition
that is tied to the emotional (egoic) self. Otherwise put: the cogito in love. This demand
for recognition is formulated as explicitly social, for it concerns the social worth. Love is
thus no longer the terrain of a purely economic calculus, but rather, it becomes a densely
saturated social phenomenon that is inseparable from the constitution of social worth as
such. Furthermore, this worth requires the recognition of the Other.
There is an operation at play in modern love, such that the demand for recognition is also
a demand for transparency. The operation of suffering is liquidated in the modern
conception of love. This is a breach with pre-modern conceptions of love, for which
Illouz enumerates fourfold: the aristocratic, Christian, Romantic, and medical. For our
purposes we will discuss the phenomenon of courtly love. The aristocratic eros is

Erotic Phenomenon by Jean-Luc Marion; Marion’s thesis herein is quite radical. Not only does he deny the
possibility of the ego’s certainty, but he argues that the can only confirm our existence (being) through love/loving.
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inseparable from the figure of the troubadour or the chivalric poet. The poetic jouissance
of courtly love privileges the experience of suffering as purifying, such that unrequited
love should not be repudiated, but lauded as an experience that exalts the subject. The
belief is that the subject could be magnified by the tear of love. Courtly love is not
irrational; it has a particular logic, a logic which interests Lacan. Conversely, the medical
conception in the seventeenth century sought to pathologize and medicalize suffering.
The term “love sickness” was taken seriously as a medical category. Richard Burton’s
Anatomy of Melancholy lists the many possible effects of “too much” love. There are
moments when Descartes seems to enter the medical register in the Passions, when he
speaks as a “natural philosopher.”
Courtly love
Lacan discusses the phenomenon of courtly love, or chivalric romance, in The Ethics of
Psychoanalysis (Seminar VII). Courtly love is considered a sublimatory venture. As a
form of poetic expression (lyric), courtly love is a highly regulated and coded practice, an
aesthetic craft which is imbued with a complex semiotics. Lacan reminds us of Freud’s
position that the effects of an artist’s work might serve the subject himself, but only
retroactively. Freud argues that the subject may derive “fantasmic satisfaction” from
aesthetic pursuits, post-factum. Lacan picks up this thread, and argues that, in order to
understand the “secondary benefits” that the subject derives from aesthetic ventures, we
must first understand the operation of the poetic function. Lacan writes, “What needs to
be justified is not simply the secondary benefits that individuals might derive from their
works, but the originary possibility of a function like the poetic function in the form of a
structure within a social consensus” (Lacan, 145). Courtly love provides insight into
“social consensus,” in that it is a genre which emerges in a restricted social space: the
aristocratic court. At the core of the highly stylized and morally explicit behaviours,
measures, services, and so on, one finds “an erotics.” Why have we forgotten the games
of the troubadours? Included in these games is a technique that must be qualified as erotic
and links the Freudian Vorlust from the Three Essays on Sexuality, with an explicitly
inaccessible object choice. Thus, courtly love is a painful and interminable process which
centers on das Ding, or, Woman as Thing.
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What was Woman for the courtly lover? The feminine object of courtly love was the
woman of feudal society who, regardless of class position, was ultimately stripped of
substantive content and reduced to “[...] nothing more than a correlative of the functions
of social exchange, the support of a certain number of goods and of symbols of power”
(Lacan, 147). As an object without content, the feminine object functioned as a vessel for
courtly love. From this emerged the figure of the Lady, which Lacan argues is “[a]
systematic and deliberate use of the signifier as such” (Lacan, 148). The feminine object
is introduced through privation, and therefore becomes an allegorical—sensual,
mystical—object. What the progenitors of courtly love invented was the Thing, or what
Lacan terms the vacuole. This enables us to ask “where, in effect, is the vacuole created
for us?” To which Lacan responds: “It is at the centre of the signifiers—insofar as the
final demand to be deprived of something real is essentially linked to the primary
symbolization which is wholly contained in the signification of the gift of love” (Lacan,
150). Because the Thing tends to locate certain “discontents” of the culture, the Lady
functions as a membrane, a bracketing, wherein fantasy can inject itself. It is essentially
an artifice, this invention. The suspicion of the Enlightenment thinkers concerning the
artificial production of love, is not wholly unjustified, a point to which I will return. What
is important to note, is that this invention is borne out of a narcissistic desire of the
subject, a desire for subjective exaltation produced by an irreducible and inaccessible
idealized object. The question of ethics is thus centered on prolongment and delay: an
interminable struggle, or foreplay, the Freudian Vorlust. As Lacan writes: “Freudianism
is in brief nothing but a perpetual allusion to the fecundity of eroticism in ethics, but it
doesn’t formulate it as such” (Lacan, 152). The ethics of courtly love teaches us that love
is both an art, and a kind of military service, as Ovid describes it in the Art of Love. To
briefly return to Freud’s point: the inaccessible core of the Thing functions as a portal to
ethics. This bulwark retroactively fulfills a moral imperative for the artist, it [das Ding] is
the “cause of the most fundamental passion,” this noblesse oblige is, in the final analysis,
directed back toward the subject.
Democracy with/without Woman
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François Poullain de la Barre (1647-1723) addresses the “Woman question” in a
seventeenth century Cartesian treatise which deals explicitly with the issue of sexual
difference and equality.60 In this text, Poullain argues that it is not qua reason (and the
supposed lack thereof) that women are subjected to civil subordination (which makes
them the “second sex” in the de Beauvoirian sense). Instead, it is a matter of belief in
Woman’s inferiority. Poullain, following Descartes, uses general principles to deduce the
equality of the sexes. It could be said that Pollain’s text is a radical and protoEnlightenment treatise, yet as the introduction demonstrates, Poullain’s intention was not
to disrupt the social fabric by postulating this claim. For him, sexual difference was not a
stain or a structural problematic; it was simply a matter of archaic beliefs.61 For him,
positing equality among the sexes does not necessarily disrupt the economic conditions.
Though Poullain interviewed “commoners” and peasants, his audience was indeed the
class of speakers known as “ladies.” Poullain’s polemic is addressed to the philosophical
authorities of his time, philosophers who, in their “scholastic” register—degraded by
Poullain as frivolous—can only produce abstractions and beliefs. Like Descartes,
Poullain saw Scholastic philosophy as contradictory to the scientific pursuit of truth: the
true object of philosophy. Poullain attempts to draw upon commonsense with the
principles of reason: he manages to argue that needlepoint requires the concentration of
physics, and he attempts to give women credit for making the most of their situation,
while arguing that they must be given the right to pursue higher ends. Poullain postulates
principles that will surge forth in the Enlightenment (feminist) discourse of Mary
Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) which holds that the “mind” is characterized as a universal
organ without a sex.62 For our purposes, we will venture into the seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century conception of mind, but rather posit a few conjectures. The

De l’Égalité des deux sexes, discours physique et moral où l’on voit l’importance de se défaire des préjugés, Paris,
Chez Jean du Puis, 1673; Fayard, 1984.
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This argument can be found in the writings of the fourteenth century Christine de Pizan (1364-1431), who argues In
the Book of the City of Ladies, that women, since they have not written about themselves, have thus been falsely
represented. De Pizan is a fascinating figure for she was both a writer of courtly love (especially with her text, Le Livre
du duc de es vraisamants from 1403, and a proto-rationalist.
62Feminist

is in parenthesis here because Wollstonecraft is first and foremost a philosopher, in the text she is explicit in
claiming that she speaks as a “philosopher” and “moralist”. When one reads her closely, one finds that she is a
“reluctant” feminist. Perhaps her reluctance is a posture we should return to, against the current grain of optimism.
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(proto)Enlightenment discourse of Descartes and Poullain posits that sexual difference is
a social phenomenon and not linked to “nature.” The cogito, under this view, “has no
sex.” Poullain’s text is an elaboration of Descartes’ formulation of “sensus communis” is
without sex, and thus that men and women are equally capable of its virtue.63
Poullain argues that the mind is not an organ of sex, however this claim is subtended by
recourse to arguments that do in fact rely on Woman’s “nature,” such that he argues that
women’s natural virtuousness grants them reason to study moral philosophy. However,
he also argues that all the sciences ought to be available to women. The tension to reduce
the sexless cogito to pure res cogitans chafes against the social fabric. Poullain’s focus on
the text is not on bodily differences but intellectual aptitudes that tend toward sameness.
This emphasis is possible as he follows the emphasis Descartes places on the primacy of
thought. Poullain cannot help but indulge trope for his cause: when women speak “their
heart is on their lips,” and they are “much more animated in the gestures that accompany
their speech.” However, these tropes are used to serve the cause for sexual equality: “All
of the above makes me believe that if women studied law they would be at least as
successful as men. They obviously love peace and justice more than we do, they dislike
quarrels and are pleased to intervene and resolve them successfully” (Poullain, 66). While
Poullain’s treatise does not deal with romantic love, he does discuss the Christian
doctrine of equality of souls and the love of God, which tends toward de-sexualization of
the subject; as previously discussed, scientific and rational philosophy always tends
toward the de-sexualization of the world. In line with the Cartesian philosophy of his
time, Poullain’s focus remains anchored within a discourse on equality/rights.
More than a hundred years later, Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of
Woman (1792) addresses a similar audience, which includes any reasonable and spirited
woman who desires emancipation from her self-incurred tutelage, as Kant insisted for all

Madeline Alcover writes in Poullain de la Barre : une aventure philosophique : “Savoir, libre-arbitre, volonté,
c’est ce qu’il a retenu du message de Descartes. Il a vu que cette philosophie, contrairement à l’autre, était une
philosophie ouverte et c’est pourquoi il a poussé des portes que Descartes avait laissées closes” (Knowledge, free will,
choice, are what Poullain has retained from Descartes’s message. He saw that Descartes’s philosophy, contrary to every
other, was open, and that is why he has pushed open some doors that Descartes had left closed), 72.
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thinking subjects in 1784.64 While other philosophers have tasked themselves with
enunciating Romantic love as a philosophical problem, Wollstonecraft explicitly links
romantic love to women’s subordination. She is opposed to the “noble” morality that
treats woman as Thing (the position of courtly love). She argues that women must
become “independent of the casualties of life,” which includes the trappings of romantic
love. She writes: “Love, in their bosoms, taking place of every nobler passion.”65 Love
ensures that women maintain their “spaniel-like affection,” and fragile constitutions,
privileging beauty over strength and love over reason. She takes issue with Rousseau and
Swedenborg for clinging to tropes that laud women’s “submissive charms,” which make
her the delicate object of man’s affection. Wollstonecraft argues that Rousseau and others
like him advance the belief that women ought to be loved for their puerile nature. The
position Wollstonecraft seems to be criticizing is the “feminine masquerade,”66 a posture
“prettily drawn by poets” and carefully curated and esteemed by women themselves
(Wollstonecraft, 165). This position holds that women are “absolute in loveliness,” as
Milton puts it. Every poet and philosopher of the eighteenth century seems to have a take
on the woman question, yet Wollstonecraft is the first to enunciate that this masquerade is
simply that: a vain performance of one’s social being. For Wollstonecraft, the question of
whether “Woman exists” is complex, and it is her brutal, unsentimental prose that
presents a novel way of confronting sexual difference. With that said, she is unable to
present her argument without recourse to the possible (innate) irrationality of women: if a
woman fails to act reasonably when she is presented with a sound argument it may be due
to “defective organs,” or “mistaken education.” Wollstonecraft ultimately seems to rely

The genre of the political treatise appropriately deals here with the discourse of “rights,” which has been criticized by
later philosophers (see Hannah Arendt’s Human Condition and Simone Weil’s on Liberty). Despite the emphasis on
civil rights and education, Wollstonecraft’s text deals extensively with trope, fantasy, and theological/literary mythmaking.
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The passage is rather breathtaking and demonstrates the stakes of Wollstonecraft’s wager; thus, I think it should be
read in full: “Love in their bosoms, taking place of every nobler passion, their sole ambition is to be fair, to raise
emotion instead of inspiring respect; and this ignoble desire, like the servility of absolute monarchies, destroys all
strength of character. Liberty is the mother of virtue, and if women are, by their very constitution, slaves, and not
allowed to breathe the sharp invigorating air of freedom, they must ever languish like exotics, and be reckoned
beautiful flaws in Nature,” Wollstonecraft, 147.
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The concept of the “feminine masquerade” first appears in Joan Riviere’s “Womanliness as a Masquerade,”
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on an Ideal Woman who does not (yet) exist. Still, for our purposes, her critique of
romantic love will provide an opening for further discussion. When she enunciates that
she is speaking “as a philosopher,” her critique of romantic love suggests that love
impedes our ability to reason, especially for the female portion of speaking subjects:
“they are made to be loved, and must not aim at respect [...]”, she continues, “lest they
should be hunted out of society as masculine” (Wollstonecraft, 144). While we cannot
deduce what the Ideal Woman might be for Wollstonecraft, we can deduce a contrario
what she is not: facile, vain, and subjugated by male authorities. She has “no sex,” insofar
that she is free to use her reason. Yet this “I,” the speaking subject who emancipates
herself in choosing the res cogitans does not escape the throes of symbolic reality.
Modernity’s violent arousal from its pre-modern state laid bare the social conditions of
the Whole.67 This coarse awakening has led to a certain “disenchantment” of reality, to
use Weber’s bon mot. What is important for our purposes is that the hyper-rationalization
of modern existence is commensurable with the ideology of self-esteem (rational selflove) and hedonic permissiveness. Love becomes a rational game for the pleasure seeking
cogito qua autonomous subject, who seeks an Other, or others, or things, for shared
(albeit as autonomous subjects) monadic bliss. The rational posture that saturates our
modern conception of love is utterly incommensurable with pre-modern conceptions.
Courtly love is the most salient example. The ecstatic surge that is recounted by
Guillaume de Loris, posits both a sacred object and an inexplicable desire.68 The figure of
cupid and the motif of “piercing,” is demonstrative of the arbitrary and jubilatory nature
of love. The concept of love that issues from the courtly tradition is “enchanted love,” the
commotion of the soul that is at odds with the light of reason. There is a heightened
idealization which requires an irreducible and incommensurable love object. Conversely,
disenchantment leads to a de-sexualization of reality and the de-idealization of the love
object, the object becomes merely one possible choice among many other

Marx’s famous passage from The Communist Manifesto: “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned,
and men at last are forced to face with sober senses the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow
men.”
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commensurable choices. Suffering and other “useless” affects become pathologized
under the aegis of love, which bears on the “medical” conception of love that plagues the
cogito (recall Burton’s love sick subject). Trapped between rational choice and
pathology, the cogito qua rational ego pursues the utilitarian-hedonic love object
measured against itself. The axiom “freedom of choice” surges forth with modernity.
The modern subject would find the notion of “dowry” obscene yet, in actuality, the
criteria for love has become more rational, as Illouz demonstrates. The operativity of the
masculine cogito cannot be divorced from the rational processes of modernity, whereby
the rational subject is situated within the Whole, as an autonomous part. The overt
pecuniary nature of love has become more stylized, volatile (the exhaustive criteria), but
it is no less dictated by the vicissitudes of liberal capitalism. As Illouz writes: “a hypercognized method of selecting a mate goes hand in hand with the cultural expectation that
love provides authentic, unmediated emotional and sexual experiences” (Illouz, 180).69
The emphasis on equality, reciprocity, self-sameness, and the superfluity of suffering are
decisively modern attitudes. With choice comes freedom. The desire to “liberate”
sexuality within modernity is paradoxically inextricable from the prohibition of language.
The rhetoric of sexual liberation can be understood as the other side of “politically
correct” sartorial, bodily, and linguistic practices. Explicitly sexualized sartorial practices
that draw attention to the body, share a common aim with minimalist, androgynous
silhouettes that attempt to eliminate erotic ambiguity. The attempt to expose the body, or
to eliminate its surface, seeks a common end: to make the body “equal.” For example,
“freeing the nipple” is an attempt at Universality: the slogan implies that there is nothing
particular about one’s bodily assemblage; it is the body in general that must be exposed.
Descartes found himself in a similar conundrum when theorizing the body in particular
(one’s own body) and the body in general.70 The attempt to obviate sexual difference
through sartorial practice is a mirror operation that endeavours to smooth over gaps borne

In her text, Illouz enumerates and describes the mechanisms that contribute to love’s rationalization:
intellectualization, rational management of the flow of encounters, visualization, commensuration, competitiveness,
maximization of utilities, 181-2.
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Marion draws attention to this problem in On Passive Thought: The Myth of Cartesian Dualism.
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out of sexual difference while positing a generality, “the body,” which cannot account for
sexual difference. Recall Roland Barthes’ Lover’s Discourse which locates erotic
uncertainty, “where the garment gapes.” In this formulation, “what” is erotic is not
given; the sign carries ambiguity. Conversely, the formalism of minimal, androgynous
silhouettes is indicative of the process of visual rationalization. It is not a coincidence that
the Antwerp Seven (the designers of androgyny par excellence) are from the Protestant
countries!71 Androgyny produces semiotic certainty: there can be no question about
whether a particular garment is erotic or not, it is a formalism which seeks to flatten out
what is erotic concerning bodily surfaces. Furthermore, androgyny as a sartorial practice
is decisively masculine, for it carries the presumption that “feminine” silhouettes are de
facto sexual. The presumption of sartorial practices is that, as autonomous subjects
(“parts” of the Whole), we participate in an intersubjective context, which presupposes a
semiotics and the possibility of mutual recognition. Thus, to be “in love” is to be
recognized: to have my transparencies recognized by the other, and this includes my
aesthetic presentation. However, as Jean-Luc Marion notes, recognition is, rather than a
desired outcome, an obstacle to the erotic, and love as such.72
The Big Other in Love
To speak sensibly of love might be impossible. Despite this, let us seek to understand
what is in the cogito that lends itself to “falling” in love? For Freud and Lacan love is
linked to a narcissistic zone, associated with autoeroticism, idealization, and projection.
The example of courtly love is paradigmatic for Lacan, for it discloses love at its most
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Renata Salecl has commented on the phenomenon of sartorial practices in her book (Per)versions of Love and Hate.
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Marion writes in The Erotic Phenomenon,: The obstacle that obstructs the opening of the amorous field—an erotic
obstacle, not an epistemological, or ontic one—consists in reciprocity itself; reciprocity only acquires this power to set
up an obstacle because one assumes, without proof or argument, that it alone offers the condition of possibility for what
the ego understands as a “happy love,” 69-70.
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illusory and extreme posture: an amorous relation predicated on absence. Indeed, this
absence extends to the sexual relationship. The imagined reciprocity between loving and
being loved provides an entry point for our inquiry. This reciprocity is constitutive of the
imaginary pulse of love, such that the subject who loves is pining to be loved, and thus
loving is not a pure activity; it is racked by passivity. In contrast to Freud or Lacan’s
discourse on the drives, this modus operandi of love is far from pure activity. Love is
conditioned by fantasy, primarily the possibility of unity, whereby two wholes make One.
What might appear as a gesture of cynicism—that is, to link love to deception—is
actually an attempt to situate love in a psychoanalytic register. Love is deception because
it is predicated on the subject’s wholeness. For Lacan, love is necessarily linked to the
narcissism of the subject; the idealism of the object produces the feeling of love, and the
profundity of loss, when the idealism is stripped away.
If the proposition that the cogito is split and this split is borne out of the originary
ontological minus of sexual difference holds, then it must be tested against the Lacanian
reading of the subject. Thus, the wager of this section is to demonstrate that sexual
difference is made explicit through the experience of love. To arrive at this point, it will
serve us to recall Lacan’s argument regarding sexual difference. When Lacan argues that
sexual difference is “real,” it is precisely because it is impossible. Thus, in order to
become “man” or “woman” the impossible barrier of the Real must be overcome. One
loses the abyssal core of the impossible in becoming either/or.73 Contrary to what we
might assume, this loss is precisely what men and women share, and what Lacan terms
“symbolic castration” is universal. What enables us to differentiate man and woman,
masculine and feminine, is the particular subjective response to castration that marks the
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The Real of sexual difference is enunciated by Zizek in The Ticklish Subject. Therein, he criticizes the possibility of
positing a binary signifier. He writes: “When Lacan claims that sexual difference is ‘real,’ he is therefore far from
elevating a historical contingent form of sexuation into a transhistorical norm [...] the claim that sexual difference is
‘real’ equals the claim that it is ‘impossible’—impossible to symbolize, to formulate, as a symbolic norm.”
Furthermore, “[...] the problem with the accusation that sexual difference involves ‘binary logic’: in so far as sexual
difference is real/impossible, it is precisely not ‘binary,’but, again, that because of which every ‘binary’ account of it
(every translation of sexual difference) into a couple of opposed symbolic features: reason versus emotion, active
versus passive…) always fails”, 273-4.
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“masculine” and “feminine” subject positions.74 The respective subject takes his or her
particular place in the field of enunciation, and this is where we must locate “sexual
difference,” as belonging to the symbolic realm, that issues forth in speech. Neither
sexual difference, nor the sexual act (as instances of a “rapport”) unites the subject with
his beloved. While the “sexual relationship” that Lacan speaks of is not to be taken
literally, it recalls the many instances of the sexual non-relation in the films of Chantal
Akerman, such as Je, Tu, Il, Elle (1974). For example, when, after hitchhiking with a
truck driver who briefly becomes her lover, Julie, the film’s idle protagonist, attempts to
sleep with her ex-girlfriend, the result is a drawn out, somewhat violent struggle between
the two women. Something happens, but at the same time there is “nothing” that can be
said: the relation is broken, there can be no rapport. There is also something “else,”
beyond the conclusion of the relationship, that makes this scene so painful (and amusing)
to watch. Each subject is utterly alone and incapable of meeting the other’s border. What
we find in the film, is torsion: the spectacle of partial objects and a failed (re)union.
Indeed, one is alone in pleasure and in pain. Akerman’s films trouble the narcissistic
structure of love, a structure that is subtended by the imaginary. Love is revealed to be
the (imagined) idea that something may successfully fill the subject’s void, a void that
produces the non-relation. The desire for unity is thwarted by the partial operation of the
drives, though a full discussion of the relationship between love and desire would require
a chapter of its own.
Consequently, we are permitted to say: there is no “love language,” only botched
formulations, hence the saliency of the enunciation, “I love you.” This proposition is not
meant to be simply provocative; rather, this formulation reveals a fundamental insight of
psychoanalysis: one cannot say anything sensible about love.75 Lacan’s famous dictum
that “the unconscious is structured like a language” reveals that the unconscious itself is
the constraints of language. As Renata Salecl writes in (Per)Versions of Love and Hate:
“the unconscious is the constraints that are at work in this discourse, this constraint is the

Recalling the argument that is made explicit by Lacan’s formulas of sexuation, and the essential interpretation of
Guy Le Gaufey from the Second Chapter.
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very existence of the unconscious—there is no unconscious hidden behind the discursive
constraints that “express” themselves in the discourse.” The effect of the unconscious,
and of “passions,” according to Salacl’s reading of Lacan, is that there is nothing exterior
to this space, the “mechanism produces the effect.” Thus, “the effect is nothing other than
the discourse itself” (Salecl, 191). The effect of the discourse of the unconscious is the
libido, and in the case of ideological discourse, the effects of (mis)recognition. The
paradox for speaking subjects is that these discursive obstacles are what “produce” love.
For Lacan, the big Other—“the divine place of the Other”—confers a “consecrated status
on the relationship between subjects, as long as the fortune of the desire of the loved one
inscribes itself in this divine place” (Ibid.).
To recall the argument regarding the Other: the other is a symbolic structure which
embeds the subject. It is not a positive social fact, but rather, as Selecl reminds us, it
possesses a “quasi-transcendental nature,” which produces a structure. The Other
structures reality and stains the subjective field, which is why Lacan insists that the
unconscious is the discourse of the Other. Furthermore, “it” has a normative status—after
all, we are contending with the social symbolic order which functions to order the social
space and to code our interactions. It is “quasi-transcendental” because it is irreducible to
the individual psyche or the Whole of society, and thus it remains “radically external.”
Accordingly, the position put forth by Lacanian psychoanalysis is irreducible to
psychology or social construction. As Salecl argues, the reduction of the Other to either
domain flouts the importance of language: “by doing this we miss the fact that language
is in itself an institution to which the subject is submitted” (192). The emphasis placed on
language, and how subjects are embedded in language qua speaking subjects is the legacy
of psychoanalysis. To this end, there is no love without speech. It is only speaking beings
who can love. What kind of speech does love constitute? Love, like other “needs” issues
forth as a demand and, as we have discussed previously, the subject, belonging to other
signifiers, carries the stain of lack. As such, love introduces the sujet barré and, like
sexual difference, it affirms that we are not Whole—that we are not fully “there,” that we
are not “One,” in the sense of fully-transparent (autonomous to ourselves) subjects
without gaps. In the space of the lack, love emerges. Lack is the cause of our desire, it
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orients us toward objects. The object of desire takes on a paradoxical status, as it reveals
lack while simultaneously covering it.

To return to the discussion of “enchanted” love, this model reveals how the subject deals
with his or her lack, and the lack in the other. There are rituals, opacities, and stylized
gestures that attempt to simultaneously reveal and cover over lack. Conversely, in our
hyper-rationalized zeitgeist, the subject cannot bear to let “the beauty remain mute,”
insofar as that uncertainty creates unbearable anxiety. Doubt, which cannot be divorced
from the modern subject, is the cause of much anxiety. The masculine cogito avows
doubt, only if it ultimately necessitates self-certainty. Love marks a difficult case for the
cogito, as it cannot be fully understood under the aegis of reason. There is a profound
incursion by way of the imagination, as Salecl notes: “The fact that love does not expect
an answer can be understood as bearing witness to its imaginary, narcissistic character:
any possible answer from the beloved object would undermine this narcissistic
relationship, it would disturb the mirroring of the subject’s ego in the beloved object”
(Salecl, 192). If the ego (the I) is self-sufficient, even in the case of love, perhaps the
cogito is fundamentally narcissistic. Descartes’ emphasis on (self)esteem seems to
suggest that the sentiment comes from within the subject, rather than the object. What
draws the subject toward the beloved is the presence of an object in him or her, rather
than the subjective force of the beloved. In response to the subjectivizing force of love,
one can either use the object “as a stopper,” which renders invisible the lack in the Other,
or we can approach the object through sublimation, “of a circulation around the object
that never touches its core” (193). The latter is undoubtedly the domain of courtly love.
This position involves a confrontation with the object as das Ding, “the traumatic foreign
body in the symbolic structure.” The subject can only orbit around the object, for she is
aware of the object’s inaccessible core. As Lacan said about the inaccessible core of the
other: “concerning sublime love that the subject realizes that [he can] only enjoy a part of
the body of the Other[...] That is why we are limited in this to a little contact, to touch
only the forearm or whatever else—ouch!” Lacan makes light of the fact that one can
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never access the Other fully, and this drives one toward narcissistic disavowal which
attempts to cover over lack, or toward the spinning plate of sublimation.76 Thus, love
reveals the impossibility of the sexual or love relation; and not only this, it also discloses
the missing gap whereby the subject’s own lack emerges. The Freudian dictum serves to
remind us: “love for oneself knows only one barrier—love for others, love for objects”
and can thus be paraphrased into “love for others knows only one barrier—love for
oneself, love for the object in oneself” (Salecl, 192).

Let us turn to the feminine cogito. If the feminine subject “woman” identifies with
Woman, the subjective response tends toward psychosis or hysteria. For our purposes, we
will discuss the latter. The hysteric probes the Other’s desire, attempting to answer the
fundamentally narcissistic question: does he love me? This formulation hinges on the
anterior question: “What am I for the Other?” The questioning of the hysteric reveals a
desire for certainty: to overcome the subject’s self-doubt and to access the truth about the
Other’s love for me. The hysteric’s desire for certainty breaks with the modality of
(self)doubt that marks the masculine cogito; certainty can only be accessed by way of the
Other, and self-doubt cannot be rescued by self-certainty. There is no space for selfsufficiency in this model. The hysteric spins plates, hunting for a sign: “In the meantime,
she becomes devoted to the cult of Woman ... in the hope that this signifier will someday
appear” (Salecl,192). The answer to the hysteric’s question, as one can imagine, does not
arrive. The subject must then seek “proofs” outside of words. Salecl draws upon the work
of Colette Soler who argues that the hysterical subject position requires that the subject is
an interpreter (Salecl, 202). When the answer does not arrive, it must be interpreted,
invented. Thus, the hysteric can obsess over the “meaning” of a look, how words are
arranged in an email, how the lover “signs off” or says goodbye. This subject position,
while in the first analysis might appear as profoundly unenlightened, is in fact less
invested in maintaining the illusion of wholeness, the presupposition that the subject is
“fully” there.

Salecl highlights the “supreme paradox of love and institution”: sublime love can only emerge in contradistinction to
a contractual, mediated “symbolic exchange,”
76

80

The emergence of the figure of the hysteric functions as an index for modernity, in which
the hysteric responds to the operation of choice, and in particular to the “forced choice.”
The forced choice has a profound subjectivizing effect: it changes the subject’s position
of enunciation. We assume that “loving” our contingent existences (family, state,
neighbours, and so on) amounts to a substantive (free) choice, yet the injunction to “love”
our situations simply affirms our lack of choice. However, the subject of the enunciation
(as discussed in the previous chapter) is altered in this process. The concept of forced
choice is described by Mladen Dolar in Voice as Love Object, in the following way: “the
forced choice is not simply an absence of choice: the choice is offered and denied in the
same gesture, but this empty gesture is what counts for subjectivity” (Dolar, 130). When
the subject enters the social space, this entry is marked by “forced choice.” Love is a
salient example of this exchange; when the subject enters the symbolic domain of love,
the choice available to him is “forced.” As previously discussed, the love relation of
marriage was highly overdetermined in pre-modernity yet remained less intellectualized
and ultimately less rationalized. There are of course exceptions to this overdetermined
relation, namely, the erotic self-abandonment that one finds with unrequited love, as the
courtly ethos demonstrates. Under the aegis of erotic abandonment, the force of love’s
demand tends toward necessity; the subject is pulled toward self-abandonment and the
surrender of will to the Other.
Perhaps this is what it means to “fall” in love. As Dolar writes:“Falling in love means
submitting to the necessity—there is always the moment when the Real, so to speak,
begins to speak, its opacity turns into transparency, the senseless sign becomes to
embodiment of the highest sense, and the subject is reduced to recognizing it after the
fact” (Dolar, 123). For Dolar, this description is the moment of erotic love. One must
note his use of “after the fact.” It is not the case that the subject who “falls” in love has
immediate access to what is taking place; there is retroactivity at play, whereby the
subject can reorganize the sequence of meanings to make sense of them. This seems to
disrupt the order of what Descartes carefully circumscribed. However, it is no less
narcissistic. Dolar reminds us of one of the oldest, and perhaps shared dictums of
philosophy and psychoanalysis: “Know thyself.” However, this knowledge carries a
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particular caveat: “There is a part of non-knowledge, an essential ignorance, which
appears as the condition of a long and happy life, or simply, life—a part of fundamental
loss that one has to incur. Narcissus will come to know himself, he will prefer the
philosophical maxim to the prophet’s warning” (Dolar, 138).77 Knowing oneself can lead
to a certain fatality. The mirror that is the Other for myself in love entails a certain loss of
being, a loss that is experienced as traumatic for the subject, specifically the masculine
cogito, whose identity involves the forfeiture of being for thought. We might even say
that one becomes “enlightened” only by having knowledge of one’s symbolic castration.
As Dolar writes: “to put it simply: when I recognize myself in the mirror, it is already too
late. There is a split: I cannot recognize myself and at the same time be one with myself”
(Ibid.). The loss is the subject’s self-being, what can be understood as the “immediate
coincidence with myself in my being and jouissance,” is the juncture whereby the
pleasure one derives in having the “gaze returned,” by the lover. This “exchange” comes
at a cost: the mirror image of self must be paid for, and at the same time has already been
paid for in advance. The operation of doubling is play: I see myself in the other, and this,
as Dolar writes “entails the loss of that uniqueness one could only enjoy in one's selfbeing—only at the price of being neither ego nor a subject” (Ibid.).78 Love, as an effort to
disseminate the subject’s lack, necessarily implies a loss of being. Recall Lacan’s
formulation in the Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: “I love you, but,
because inexplicably I love in you something more than yourself—the objet petit a—
mutilate you” (Lacan, 263).
The suspicion of the moderns is not wholly unreasonable. The seductive sheen of love is
marked by mechanicity. There is a mechanical and seemingly automatic operativity
involved in falling in love, and thus one finds in the era of Enlightenment certain
contempt of romantic love. As we saw in Wollstonecraft’s treatise, the subject is indicted

There is a moment in the legend of Narcissus where the blind seer Tiresias gives the prophecy to the beautiful boy’s
mother: “Narcissus will live to a ripe old age, provided that he never knows himself,” Graves quoted in Dolar, 139.
77

78As

Freud writes in his essay on the Uncanny: “This invention of doubling as a preservation against extinction has its
counterpart in the language of dreams, which is fond of representing castration by a doubling or a multiplication of a
genital symbol,” quoted in Dolar, 138.
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for endorsing the frivolity of love’s mythos. Dolar’s reasoning suggests that it is due to
the notion that love can be artificially produced. Dolar’s examples are superb, in drawing
from Mozart’s Cosi fan tutte (1790) he writes: “If the new love of the two ladies was so
easily provoked synthetically by simple devices, contingency and fate so easily
counterfeited, then this second love casts long shadows over the original one, before the
wager, when everybody seemed happy: it retroactively makes the first love just as
artificial and arbitrary [...]”79 Dolar’s reading reveals how the pre-modern belief in love
of the ecstatic variety, as well as the customary (contractual) love, is laid bare to analysis
(aesthetic or philosophical) to reveal the commensurable, easily manipulated, fact of
love.80 This critique was certainly apparent to Wollstonecraft, yet it does not carry the
traumatic weight that Dolar seems to imply. It seems, in contrast to Wollstonecraft's
sobriety, traumatic for the masculine subject who thus invents the figure of les femmes
machines, female automatons or puppets, to hide the narcissistic wound and the suspicion
that one’s lover may not be in love with him after all, but only herself. This suspicion one
finds in Marivaux, Mozart, and previously in Moliere (his pleasure in making parody of
“learned ladies”) who, in their brilliance are nonetheless exemplary of the masculine
cogito. It is their belief in love that is shattered, which seems to contrast the sobriety of
early modern treatises on love—and especially in Wollstonecraft. While many women
likely fell for the romantic mythos (as Wollstonecraft makes clear her belief: most
women are utterly frivolous due to social imperatives), it is particularly interesting to see
the masculine subject confront the “extimacy” of the love relation. While a shared
suspicion of feminine frivolity might link these poses (which seem to be explicitly
phallic), the subject positions (feminine/masculine cogito) approach the shattering of
love’s seductive sheen quite differently. By this, I advance the thesis of the previous two
chapters, that the subjective responses to castration is what marks sexual difference as
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The title could be roughly translated as: “So do they all,” (using the feminine tutte; signalling Woman)

80Another

brilliant example that Dolar brings to mind is Hoffman’s short story, The Sandman, whereby a young man
falls in love with an automaton (one could read this story as a precursor to Jonze’s Her) Dolar writes: “Hoffmann’s
ironical twist, the social parody implied in the episode, highlights the role assigned to the woman: it is enough to be
there, at the appropriate place, at the most to utter an “Oh!” at the appropriate time to produce that specter of Woman,
the figure of the Other. The mechanical doll only highlights the mechanical character of love relations. Both the subject
falling in love and the object can be reduced to an automaton: we have the perfect love machine,” 149.
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such. Modern subjectivity struggles against its own epistemic desires. Enlightenment’s
causa sui of freedom, conflicts with its interest in automata, an interest that began in
early modernity (in Descartes and Pascal). The mechanical doll, which connotes
femininity, becomes the counterpoint to the rational ego. The imperative to “leave the
doll's house,” however, is not so straightforward for it entails a fight against the
machinations of determinism, only by finding one’s place in it.

3.1 « Coda: Dissatisfaction»
Our modern romantic conundrum can be summarized in the following way: we desire the
Big Other’s symbolic regulation, which includes the superego’s ubiquitous injunction to
“enjoy.” Yet, this enjoyment is utterly banal and permissive. The circuits of endless
choice that one finds in pornography (with a multiplicity of genres), and relationship
“formations,” like polyamory and other “creative” contractual assemblages, ultimately
cause dissatisfaction, rather than pleasure. All “transgressive” tendencies have been
absorbed into the insatiable symbolic structure.81 If one wants to thwart “production,” and
the “sexual” production of subjectivity as such, how might this come to be? Is (social)
apostasy even remotely meaningful in our current juncture? If the forced choice of
abstinence, which is the posture of the current “incel” zeitgeist, is an attempt to rupture
the (sexual) production of subjectivity, does this have any meaningful effect?82 Is this not
simply the other side of hedonic permissiveness? Our cultural ethos is marked by the
double operation of regulation and guarantee. Pleasure, despite being permissive, remains
highly regulated (is permissiveness or “unregulated” pleasure not itself a kind of
regulation?), while the rational culture of romantic love promises a transcendental
guarantee of the subject’s safety and self-certainty. Under the rubric of a hyperrationalized romantic calculus, the antagonism reaches beyond the conflict of Kantian
antinomies; yet, the subject does not have the adequate concepts to make sense of this
“split.” This is where psychoanalysis comes to bear.

The malaise of hypermodern eros has been gloomily (yet marvelously) articulated in Byung Chul Han’s The Agony
of Eros.
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A good reading of “online culture that has spawned the figure of the “incel” can be found in Angela Nagle’s Kill All
Normies or more recently, a text by Nina Power https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-art-of-the-incel
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The example of the love object in transference provides a unique purchase on
subjectivation. Love emerges at the juncture where words are missing. The subject offers
her being to fill the lack and to give herself to the Other. The unreturned gaze stains the
field of desire when the subject is forced to come to terms with the absent reciprocity. As
Dolar writes, “So love emerges at the point of a lacking word, and one offers one's being
to fill the lack, to sustain the Other, to seduce him” (Dolar, 149).83 Psychoanalysis
produces love as a symptom, the prime example being the lack of reciprocity that takes
place in the relation between analyst and analysand. However, it is precisely when the
Other does not return the gaze that one may begin to question, when the repetition is
thwarted, and the silent wall obviates the subject’s desire for reciprocity. The moment of
“the falling out of object a” is embodied by the unreturned gaze. Thus, what transpires is
the boring of a hole, which creates a distance between the I (ego ideal) and the a in the
formulation proposed by Lacan in Seminar XI. This moment could also be described as
the “crossing” of the fundamental fantasy, andcan be read subjectively and through
sexual difference. One might find freedom in this “closure,” recalling Freud’s use of
Übertragungswiderstand. Transference is resistance precisely because it closes the
unconscious, rather than laying it bare. Thus, the cogito is presented with a “choice”: to
traverse the fantasy of being in pursuit of the Other’s desire (the hysteric’s questioning
and traumatic conclusion) or to remain stuck in the open circuits of fantasy being that
marks the masculine cogito. It seems that we can sufficiently conclude, that the
enlightened position is, in the final analysis, castration; and this position of enunciation
belongs to the feminine cogito.

Speaking of seduction, this brings to mind a favourite example of Lacan’s: As Lacan says, “[T]he Other whom we
long for is anything other than love, it is something that literally causes the love to decay—I want to say, something
that has the nature of object.” (Lacan, 183). The realization, or refusal of the beloved one to be the object of desire
produces a traumatic incursion for the subject. Lacan’s example is the failed courtship of Alcibiades (of Socrates) in the
Symposium, whereby Socrates rejects the becoming-love object. He affirms his worthlessness; he cannot be what the
Other desires.
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